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If the United States Supreme Court conceived of the right to vote
as an active entitlement that safeguards other fundamental rights
rather than as a passive privilege that permits courts to prioritize
state sovereignty over broad enfranchisement, then many of the er-
rors that have become commonplace in our system of elections would
not occur. It is unlikely, however, that the Court will take the steps
necessary to extend the constitutional protections afforded to the
right to vote. In recent years, the Court has sharply circumscribed
Congress’s ability to protect the right to vote under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, rejecting any new conceptual framework
that would more properly allocate authority over voting rights be-
tween the states and the federal government.
Nonetheless, both scholars and voting rights advocates can take
advantage of the existing framework, by using the Elections Clause
to supplement the Reconstruction Amendments in an effort to protect
voting rights and defend the scope of federal antidiscrimination
legislation. Under the Clause, states set procedural regulations that
govern federal elections, but Congress can also enact its own laws
and, more importantly, veto state regulations at will. This provision
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. Thanks to
Chris Elmendorf, Rachael Grant, Steve Kolbert, Jake Linford, Derek Muller, James Salz-
mann, and Mark Seidenfeld for useful feedback and comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also
to Matletha Fuller, Mina Saffarian, the librarians at Florida State University College of Law,
and the librarians at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law for excellent
research assistance. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the editors of the William & Mary Law
Review, who did superb work on this Article.
2211
2212 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2211
has been significantly underutilized in the two-centuries-long battle
over the regulation of federal elections.
Despite this unique structure that places final policy-making
authority in the hands of Congress, both the Supreme Court and
legal scholars tend to discuss the Clause in federalism terms, charac-
terizing the exercise of federal power as a rare and somewhat unwel-
come intrusion on the states’ relatively broad authority to legislate
with respect to federal elections. Contrary to this view, this Article
argues that Congress and the courts can disregard state sovereignty
in enacting, enforcing, and resolving the constitutionality of legis-
lation passed pursuant to the Elections Clause. Close examination
reveals that the Clause’s structure does not fit comfortably within
any of the prevailing theories of federalism, which deploy notions of
state sovereignty in ways that are inconsistent with the Clause’s text,
purpose, and history.
Descriptively, federalism doctrine fails to explain the regulatory
dynamic between the states and Congress over federal elections be-
cause the Clause embodies values other than those that our federalist
system safeguards. Traditional federalism doctrine emphasizes ob-
jectives such as increased citizen involvement, experimentation, and
innovation in state government. In contrast, the touchstone of the
Elections Clause is the continued existence and political legitimacy
of federal elections: that a winner be chosen from an electoral pro-
cess—implemented by the states at the sufferance of Congress—that
is legitimized by clear rules and a definitive outcome. This focus
makes it difficult to embrace the state-centric approach of traditional
federalism, or the flexibility and nationalism that is the hallmark of
the “new” federalism. This insight has significant implications as we
approach the 2020 redistricting cycle, in which states will seek to
defend discriminatory redistricting plans, enact more restrictive
voting laws, and challenge the constitutionality of federal voting
rights legislation on federalism grounds.
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INTRODUCTION
During the oral argument for Shelby County v. Holder, which
involved a constitutional challenge to sections 4(b) and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965,1 Justice Antonin Scalia surprised
onlookers by arguing that section 5’s unanimous reauthorization by
the Senate in 2006 weighed against, rather than in favor of, the
constitutionality of these provisions.2 He contended that section 5
was part of a grand scheme of “racial entitlements” that are very
difficult to reverse through the legislative process;3 thus, the unan-
imous vote in favor of reauthorizing the Act was indicative, not of
public preference, but of the desire of special interest groups to in-
sulate the VRA from ever being legislatively overturned.4 Other
members of the Supreme Court may not have framed the problems
surrounding the VRA in those terms, but they agreed with Justice
Scalia’s basic insight that the statute impermissibly gave minority
groups an advantage in the legislative process over the majority at
the expense of state sovereignty.5
The Court’s attempt to strike a balance between these competing,
and sometimes conflicting, principles has led to a jurisprudence that
is inconsistent, insufficiently protective of minority rights, and over-
values the states’ sovereignty over elections.6 One of the most ne-
farious examples of this problematic approach is in the area of
1. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 4-5, 120 Stat. 577, 580-
81 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
2. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-17, 47-48, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013) (No. 12-96).
3. Id. at 47.
4. See id. at 47-48. Justice Scalia further observed 
that this is not the kind of a question you can leave to Congress. There are
certain districts in the House that are black districts by law just about now. And
even the Virginia Senators, they have no interest in voting against this. The
State government is not their government, and they are going to lose—they are
going to lose votes if they do not reenact the Voting Rights Act. 
Even the name of it is wonderful: The Voting Rights Act. Who is going to vote
against that in the future?
Id.
5. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2618-19, 2623-24, 2631.
6. See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the
Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1196-98, 1200 (2012).
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legislative redistricting. Here, the Justices have breathed new life
into racial gerrymandering claims as a means of policing state
redistricting plans that infringe on minority rights,7 while simulta-
neously permitting partisan justifications in the name of state
sovereignty that could otherwise legitimize regressive and prob-
lematic plans.8 But there are also other cases in which the Court
shows undue solicitude to the states, such as those involving voter
identification laws and other restrictive voting laws that make it
significantly more difficult to cast a ballot,9 illustrating that the
storied position of state sovereignty as the focal point of our fed-
eralist system holds steady even when unwarranted.10
Along the same lines, Shelby County invalidated section 4(b) of
the VRA for infringing on the “equal sovereignty” of the states
through a formula that used forty-year-old data to single out certain
jurisdictions for voting rights violations.11 Indicative of recent case
law limiting the reach of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
because of federalism concerns, the Court focused its attention on
“rediscovering” the arbitrary divide between the states and the
federal government over election regulation more generally.12 In
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (Arizona Inter Tribal), for
example, the Court held that Congress’s authority under the Elec-
tions Clause over the “Times, Places and Manner”13 of federal elec-
tions “is paramount,”14 but does not extend to regulating voter
qualification standards, which fall firmly within the province of the
7. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
8. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305-06 (2004) (plurality opinion). But see Gill v.
Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289, 2289 (2017) (mem.) (enjoining enforcement of Wisconsin
redistricting plan as impermissible political gerrymandering, pending disposition on appeal
to the Supreme Court), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
9. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
10. See Tolson, supra note 6, at 1196-98, 1200.
11. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621-24, 2630-31 (2013).
12. Compare Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (finding that a
redistricting plan enacted with discriminatory intent should be precleared under section 5 if
the plan is nonretrogressive), with Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2621, 2632 (criticizing
Congress’s decision to legislatively overturn Reno v. Bossier Parish by amending section 5 “to
prohibit more conduct than before,” including “voting changes with ‘any discriminatory
purpose’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(c) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(c) (Supp. III
2016)))).
13. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
14. Id. (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880)).
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states.15 Similarly, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independ-
ent Redistricting Commission (Arizona IRC), the Court held that
Arizona voters, acting through a state ballot initiative, can delegate
the legislature’s redistricting authority to an independent commis-
sion because the Elections Clause’s use of the term “legislature”
embodied whatever prescriptions for lawmaking that the state
established in its constitution.16 Like Shelby County, the Arizona
cases recognize, first, that the federal government’s interference
with laws that fall firmly within the province of state authority
trigger significant constitutional issues;17 and second, the presump-
tive constitutionality of state law to which the Court will generally
defer, even when interpreting federal constitutional provisions.18 All
of these cases have contributed to the view that election law is
federalism based, with clearly delineated spheres of authority for
the state and federal governments, respectively.
This Article challenges the prevailing view that federalism best
explains our system of elections, and argues that, unlike the antidis-
crimination framework of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, Congress and the courts can disregard state sovereignty in
enacting, enforcing, and resolving the constitutionality of legislation
passed pursuant to the Elections Clause. The Clause gives states
control over the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections, but
it also empowers Congress to “make or alter” these regulations at
will.19 Once one examines the text and structure of the Elections
15. See id. at 2258-59 (observing that “it would raise serious constitutional doubts if a
federal statute precluded a State from obtaining the information necessary to enforce its voter
qualifications”).
16. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671, 2677 (2015). This Article does not challenge the state’s ability
to delegate its redistricting authority to an independent commission. Rather, the issue is the
Court’s failure to treat congressional approval as dispositive of the issue, and its reliance
instead on the presumptive validity of state law. See infra Part II. This conception is at odds
with the notion of congressional sovereignty.
17. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623-27 (describing the states’ broad power regarding
elections, the exceptional circumstances under which Congress first passed the Voting Rights
Act, and the significant constitutional issues that developed over time from this federal
action); see also Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2666-67; Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2254-
57.
18. See Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2673; Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
19. The Elections Clause, in its entirety, provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regu-
lations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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Clause, it is clear that this provision does not fit comfortably within
any of the prevailing theories of federalism.20 This insight is par-
ticularly powerful in the redistricting context, in which states rely
on their authority under the Clause to draw congressional districts
and have traditionally enjoyed wide berth in constructing these dis-
tricts, largely subject only to the constraints of the once powerful,
but recently more limited Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.21
As this Article shows, Congress’s authority under the Elections
Clause is significantly broader than the Court has acknowledged,
and can be a powerful bulwark against discriminatory state laws
that are usually defended on the grounds of state sovereignty
against Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenges.22 The
breadth of congressional power under the Clause lies in Congress’s
ability to veto state law at will, a feature that is at odds with most
of the prevailing views of federalism.23 Traditional federalism doc-
trine prioritizes experimentation in governance dispersed among
the fifty states—a variation that emerges, in part, from limiting the
reach of the federal government.24
In contrast, the Elections Clause has its own unique set of values
that place a premium on congressional sovereignty. When it comes
to federal elections, Congress rarely intervenes to increase cooper-
ation between the states and federal government in order to—for
example—encourage a regulatory partnership that allows Congress
to influence policy areas beyond the scope of its enumerated pow-
ers.25 Congress’s authority over setting the “Times, Places and
20. See infra Part III.
21. Compare City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173, 175-76, 179 (1980)
(describing broad and expansive congressional authority to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments), abrogated by Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2621, with City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (limiting Congress’s enforcement powers to remedial
fixes).
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991) (reviewing the “system of
dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government”).
25. See Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebelius, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (2014) (arguing that the Clean Water Act is a use of Congress’s
authority under the Spending Clause that “enables Congress to bargain with states for access
to policymaking arenas that are beyond the reach of its other enumerated powers”); cf. Clean
Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012)).
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Manner”26 of federal elections “is paramount,”27 and this body has,
on occasion, imposed substantive requirements that states must
follow when structuring federal elections.28 Nor is the Clause fre-
quently invoked in order to nationalize election administration or to
limit state power to a particular substantive area;29 Congress as-
sumes that well-functioning states will fill in most of the blanks
with respect to the nuts and bolts of federal elections,30 but has
been willing to impose uniformity if the need arises.31 Indeed, the
Clause’s overarching purpose is to ensure the continued existence
and legitimacy of federal elections,32 so the text empowers Congress
to engage in the quintessentially “anti-”federalism action of dis-
placing state law and commandeering state officials toward achiev-
ing this end.33 Yet the federalism label still persists as its animating
theory, even though the Clause is not concerned with protecting the
sovereignty of the states.34
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I argues that dis-
enfranchisement has become the norm in American elections, not
only because of the invalidation of portions of the VRA, but also
because of the Court’s reluctance to create a robust framework that
places positive obligations on states to ensure broad enfranchise-
ment. Part of the difficulty is structural—the text of the United
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
27. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 392 (1880)).
28. See infra note 44.
29. Cf. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2012 (2012); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 207 (1983) (noting that the
Atomic Energy Act gave the Atomic Energy Commission “exclusive jurisdiction to license the
transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear materials. Upon these
subjects, no role was left for the States” (citations omitted)).
30. Well-functioning should not be confused with the idea that states are sovereign over
federal elections. See Tolson, supra note 6, at 1244-45.
31. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276 (2004) (plurality opinion) (describing
the Apportionment Acts of 1842, 1862, and 1901, which required, at various points, that
members of the House be elected from single-member districts that are compact, contiguous,
or have equal populations).
32. Cf. Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2015).
33. See id.
34. Recent scholarship has contributed to the view that the Elections Clause is about
federalism. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the
Elections Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 849-51 (2015); Derek T. Muller, The Play in the
Joints of the Election Clauses, 13 ELECTION L.J. 310, 310-12 (2014); Justin Weinstein-Tull,
Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 753 (2016). 
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States Constitution does not contain an explicit and affirmative
right to vote, and gives the states considerable authority over the
electoral process.35 The other problem lies with the constraints that
the Court has imposed on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, including, but not limited to, the onerous discriminatory
purpose requirement when states enact facially neutral, but re-
strictive voting legislation; the Court’s overly deferential posture
toward the state’s justification for the disputed law; and the limited
remedies that the Court accords to prevailing plaintiffs in voting
rights litigation.36
Oddly, as the Court has restricted the scope of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, recent cases have read the Elections
Clause quite expansively.37 However, as Part II shows, the Court
applies the same federalism assumptions to the Clause that ani-
mate its jurisprudence under the Reconstruction Amendments and,
as a result, has not read the Clause’s terms broadly enough. Part II
discusses the Court’s most recent Elections Clause cases, Arizona
Inter Tribal and Arizona IRC, to show how the Court has miscon-
strued and undertheorized Congress’s authority under the Elections
Clause while purporting to vindicate federal power. Any theoretical
framework should emphasize that, not only does Congress have
broad authority under its mandates, but Congress also can act in
complete disregard of state sovereignty in exercising this author-
ity.38 Yet, these decisions do the exact opposite. The Court’s con-
tention in Arizona Inter Tribal that Congress has no control over
voter qualifications pursuant to the Clause, for example, is an effort
to enforce a strict dichotomy of dual sovereignty.39 Likewise, in
35. See Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) (“The Clause’s substantive scope
is broad. ‘Times, Places, and Manner,’ we have written, are ‘comprehensive words,’ which
‘embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections.’” (quoting Smiley
v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932))).
36. See Franita Tolson, Setting a Voting Rights Agenda in an Era of “Legal” Disenfran-
chisement, in WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA? RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LAW AND POLICY IN
THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 1.1, 1.1, 1.6 (2016), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/
Whats%20the%20Big%20Idea.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C4V-P24E].
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part III.C.2.
39. See Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections (Dec. 4,
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that Congress can regulate
voter qualifications pursuant to the Elections Clause in certain limited circumstances).
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Arizona IRC, the Court allowed Arizona to adopt fairly flexible
lawmaking procedures in implementing the times, places, and
manner of federal elections, but its failure to make Congress’s
endorsement of the full range of these procedures through federal
statute indispensable to the holding shows that the Court is
analyzing these issues within a federalism framework in which
states retain sovereign authority.40
At least some of the Court’s mischaracterization of congressional
power under the Elections Clause can be laid at the feet of federal-
ism theory. As Part III argues, much of the doctrine—without
passing judgment on the merits of each theory—is an ill fit as a
potential theoretical framework for the Clause, which is about
decentralization, not federalism.41 This Part shows how, descrip-
tively, federalism doctrine fails to explain the dynamics between the
states and federal government because the Clause’s text, structure,
and purpose embody values other than those that are traditionally
safeguarded by our federalist system. These values include: (1)
preserving the legitimacy of federal elections through respect for
popular sovereignty; (2) ensuring finality of outcome and ease of
administration with respect to federal elections; and (3) reinforcing
the primacy of congressional sovereignty which—in this context—is
embodied by Congress’s independent authority to make legislation,
alter state law, and commandeer state officials to implement federal
law.42
This Article concludes that the Elections Clause is not only an
affirmative grant of power to the federal government that allows
Congress to legislate irrespective of state sovereignty, but also one
that empowers courts to aggressively police state action to protect
the fundamental right to vote, particularly when states use their
Elections Clause authority to shut otherwise legitimate voters out
40. See Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671-73, 2677 (2015).
41. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20-21 (2008) (“[F]ederalism grants subunits of government a final say
in certain areas of governance,” whereas in a decentralized regime “the central government
decides how decision-making authority will be divided between itself and the geographical
subunits”); Tolson, supra note 6, at 1242-58 (noting that the decentralization of the Elections
Clause is often confused with federalism, despite the fact that Congress has the final say in
how authority is delegated under the Clause).
42. See infra Part III.
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of the political process. To effectively prevent states from enacting
laws that undermine the right to vote, litigation under the Recon-
struction Amendments must become part of the strategy and can no
longer be the whole strategy.43 Instead, voting rights advocates can
rely on the Elections Clause by: (1) vigorously enforcing statutory
provisions such as the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and the
National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), both of which Congress
enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause to ensure broad registra-
tion and participation in federal elections;44 (2) seeking new legis-
lation based on broad authority that the federal government retains
under the Elections Clause post-Shelby County; and (3) defending
current antidiscrimination laws based on some combination of the
Elections Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.45
Because of the Election Clause’s overarching emphasis on preserv-
ing the legitimacy of federal elections, this approach will help voting
rights advocates build on the successes of this decade and challenge
disenfranchising state laws in the post-2020 round of redistricting.
I. THE SPECTER OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN RECENT VOTING RIGHTS
CASES
2016 was a banner year for voting rights advocates, who success-
fully challenged numerous restrictive laws under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. Yet many of these court decisions,
which were huge accomplishments by any metric, also revealed the
weaknesses of these constitutional provisions in ways that raise red
flags for the path forward. These limitations emerged because of the
43. See Tolson, supra note 36, at 1.1-1.3, 1.5-1.6.
44. Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-
15545 (2012) (current version at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145 (Supp. III 2016)), in response to
the controversy over the 2000 election. Leonard Shambon & Keith Abouchar, Trapped by
Precincts? The Help America Vote Act’s Provisional Ballots and the Problem of Precincts, 10
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 133, 134 (2006). HAVA sets minimum standards for election
administration, primarily dealing with upgrades for voting technology. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C.
§§ 20141-20143, 20151-20153 (Supp. III 2016). The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)
of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2012) (current version at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-20511), governs
voter registration for federal elections, making it easier for individuals to register at certain
state offices including DMVs (which is why the statute is referred to as the “motor-voter” law).
Weinstein-Tull, supra note 34, at 755.
45. See Tolson, supra note 6, at 1200-01 (making this argument with respect to section 5
of the VRA).
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courts’ reasoning, and also because some of these decisions were
significantly limited on appeal in ways that affected the ability of
those participating in the 2016 elections to cast a meaningful bal-
lot.46 While these cases do not directly discuss the Elections Clause,
they reveal that the Clause’s increasing importance is best reflected,
not only by recent Supreme Court cases recognizing its scope, but
also in recent case law that, while invalidating restrictive state
voting legislation under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
indicates that additional tools may be necessary to supplement
these efforts in the voting rights battles ahead.47
A. Whither Discriminatory Intent? Legal Challenges to Restrictive
Voting Laws in the Lower Courts
In Shelby County v. Holder, decided in 2013, and NAMUDNO v.
Holder, decided four years earlier, the Supreme Court criticized the
preclearance provisions of sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA for—
among other things—forcing states to solicit permission from the
federal government to enact laws that they would otherwise have
the authority to implement.48 This imposed a significant and, in the
Court’s view, unwarranted federalism cost.49 Federalism concerns
also played a role in recent cases, although in less obvious ways. In
the lower courts, federalism has manifested in the courts’ overly
deferential posture toward state justifications for the disputed law;
refusal to resolve an otherwise meritorious claim (otherwise known
as the abuse of the constitutional avoidance canon); or alternatively,
in the limited remedies accorded to plaintiffs despite winning on
the merits.50
46. See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (allowing Texas to
“soften” its voter identification law while the district court, Fifth Circuit panel, and en banc
Fifth Circuit, volleyed back and forth on the question of discriminatory intent), aff’d in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, vacated in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
47. See Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 95, 100, 107-13 (2013).
48. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618, 2621, 2626-27 (2013); Nw. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 202-03 (2009).
49. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2618, 2621, 2626-27.
50. See generally Tolson, supra note 36 (discussing these cases at length).
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For example, in Frank v. Walker, the Seventh Circuit stayed an
injunction requiring Wisconsin officials to accept an affidavit in-
stead of photo identification from voters at the polls.51 The court
allowed Wisconsin to amend its voter identification law to permit
individuals to fill out paperwork at the state’s department of motor
vehicles and receive a free ID in the mail, without having to provide
photo evidence of their identity.52 The Seventh Circuit sustained the
revised free identification process,53 even though it did not amelio-
rate the burdens of the law on the disproportionate number of
minorities without transportation.54 The court also ignored that
allowing individuals to obtain a free ID without proof of identifica-
tion undermined the state’s concerns about fraud, and completely
disregarded the findings of several district court judges that the
voter identification law violated some combination of the First,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as well as the VRA.55 In a
prior opinion, the Seventh Circuit rejected these claims, adopting a
reading of the relevant case law that increased the plaintiff ’s
evidentiary burden.56 Noticeably absent from the Seventh Circuit’s
51. Nos. 16-3003 & 16-3052, 2016 WL 4224616, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016). In February
2017, the Seventh Circuit heard oral arguments challenging Wisconsin’s refusal to let people
vote using an affidavit if they could not get identification, but the court has not issued its
decision on the merits yet.
52. See id.
53. See id.; see also League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851
N.W.2d 302, 305-06 (Wis. 2014) (upholding the voter identification law without an affidavit
option in parallel state proceeding).
54. See JOHN PAWASARAT, THE DRIVER LICENSE STATUS OF THE VOTING AGE POPULATION
IN WISCONSIN (2006), http://dc.uwm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067& context=eti_pubs
[https://perma.cc/5C2N-8T93].
55. See One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-324-jdp (W.D. Wis. Aug. 1, 2016) (order
entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs); Frank v. Walker, 196 F. Supp. 3d 893, 897-98 (E.D.
Wis. 2016) (order granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction) (citing Frank v.
Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014)). The case before the Eastern District of
Wisconsin adopted the affidavit requirement. See Walker, 196 F. Supp. 3d at 898. The
Western District declined to impose this requirement and instead required the State to refine
the manner in which individuals can obtain free IDs. See One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, No.
15-cv-324-jdp, at 2-3 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 1, 2016) (order entering judgment in favor of plaintiff).
The Seventh Circuit denied the State’s motion to stay the Western District’s order. See One
Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, Nos. 16-3083 & 16-3091 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2016) (order denying
defendants’ motion to stay injunction).
56. See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Franita Tolson, What
Is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 480 (2015) (“[T]he
Seventh Circuit, in resolving Frank v. Walker on appeal, adopted a reading of section 2 [of the
VRA] that raised the evidentiary burden to one that would require plaintiffs to show that the
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analysis of the preliminary injunction was any assessment of
whether the law imposed a burden that was unjustifiable in light of
the state’s asserted justifications for its adoption, and why, given
this burden, it was inappropriate to relax the requirements of an
otherwise impermissible law.57
The Seventh Circuit’s approach has become commonplace for
three reasons. First, courts start from the baseline that states retain
sovereignty over voter qualifications when analyzing claims pur-
suant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, making them
less likely to accuse the state of acting in a discriminatory manner.
In Veasey v. Abbott, for example, a panel of the Fifth Circuit in-
validated Texas’s voter identification law pursuant to section 2 of
the VRA,58 which examines how “a certain electoral law, practice, or
structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to
elect their preferred representatives.”59 The court relied on an
effects analysis, in part, because it was uncomfortable with finding
that the state (especially in its sovereign capacity) engaged in
intentional discrimination.60 But in rejecting the district court’s
analysis of the constitutional claim, the appeals court parsed the
evidence in a very formalistic manner, relying on older instances of
discrimination to validate the statutory claim that the law had a
discriminatory effect,61 while disregarding this evidence with respect
voter-identification law amounts to what is essentially an absolute barrier to voting.”).
57. Instead, the court cites to Crawford v. Marion County Election Board as a blanket
endorsement of voter identification laws subject to challenge only if there is proof that a voter
has been unduly burdened, and not by an absence of evidence as to the law’s utility. See Frank
v. Walker, Nos. 16-3003 & 16-3052, 2016 WL 4224616, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016) (order
staying injunction) (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008)).
In refusing to hear the case en banc, the court also credited the state’s representations
without any thorough analysis of the groups that would be burdened by the amended law. See
Frank v. Walker, 835 F.3d 649, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (denying petitions for
initial hearing en banc).
58. 796 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part en banc,
830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
59. Id. at 504 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)); see also 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016).
60. Cf. Veasey, 796 F.3d at 501-02 (discussing the difficulty of establishing discriminatory
intent on the part of an entire legislative body).
61. See id. at 504-05, 509-11.
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to whether the state acted with discriminatory intent and violated
the Constitution.62
This discomfort with the discriminatory intent analysis is directly
tied to the second point—the assumption that states retain sover-
eignty over elections drastically reduces the weight that courts place
on evidence of discriminatory intent. The Fifth Circuit panel was
especially troubled by what it viewed as the lack of contemporary
evidence of discrimination but, as the Supreme Court recognized in
McCleskey v. Kemp, older evidence of discrimination is still proba-
tive, just less probative than more recent examples.63
McClesky rejected instances of discrimination that were almost
one hundred years older than the contested practice (the racially
discriminatory application of the death penalty) before the Court.64
In contrast, the district court relied on official decisions and case
law from the last thirty to forty years to support its discriminatory
intent finding, including voting rights case law that found the state
acted with racially discriminatory intent.65 Indeed, in one such case
that the Fifth Circuit tried to discount, League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC ) v. Perry, the Supreme Court argued
that Texas’s actions in crafting its legislative district lines to dilute
the votes of Latinos “[bore] the mark” of the discriminatory intent
that might violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.66 It took the entire Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, to
62. See id. at 500.
63. See 481 U.S. 279, 298 n.20 (1987).
64. See Veasey, 796 F.3d at 500 (describing McClesky as “resolving that laws in force
during and just after the Civil War were not probative of the legislature’s intent in 1972”).
65. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 636 & n.23 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, rev’d in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017);
see also id. at 636 (discussing the contemporary evidence in the record, including the fact that
“[i]n every redistricting cycle since 1970, Texas has been found to have violated the VRA with
racially gerrymandered districts”). 
66. 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006); N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d
204, 222 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing LULAC favorably, noting that “[t]he LULAC Court addressed
a claim of vote dilution, but its recognition that racially polarized voting may motivate poli-
ticians to entrench themselves through discriminatory election laws applies with equal force
in the vote denial context”); cf. Veasey, 796 F.3d at 501 (discussing LULAC and stating that,
“Although citing discussions of the historic discrimination against Hispanics in Texas, the
Court did not base its decision on a conclusion that the legislature intentionally discriminated
based on ethnicity”). The Fourth Circuit also credited recent North Carolina redistricting
litigation in its discriminatory intent analysis. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 225 (“And only a few
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recognize that there was sufficient evidence before the district court
to support a finding of discriminatory intent.67 Notably, the en banc
court made this determination without crediting all of the evidence
before the district court,68 which, on remand, sustained the original
discriminatory intent finding despite the excluded evidence.69
Other courts have been more willing to establish discriminatory
intent based on an appropriate weighing of the evidence. The
Fourth Circuit, in invalidating North Carolina’s restrictive voting
laws in North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory,
found that the incidence of section 2 litigation, preclearance denials
by the Department of Justice, and its prior case law illustrating
discriminatory actions on the part of the state were all relevant to
the discriminatory intent analysis.70 The court acknowledged the
limited probative value of North Carolina’s pre-1965 history of
racial discrimination in voting.71 Nonetheless, the court used this
history to provide context and show how unprecedented and
extreme these new barriers—which included a strict voter identifi-
cation requirement, the elimination of same-day voter registration,
and a reduction in early voting days72—were with respect to ballot
access.73 A better approach to resolving intertwining statutory and
constitutional claims is for courts to limit their reliance on older
months ago ... a three-judge court addressed a redistricting plan adopted by the same General
Assembly that enacted SL 2013-381.... [A] holding that a legislature impermissibly relied on
race certainly provides relevant evidence as to whether race motivated other election
legislation passed by the same legislature.”).
67. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 241 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (plurality opinion),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
68. Id.
69. See Veasey v. Abbott, 249 F. Supp. 3d 868, 871-72 (S.D. Tex. 2017). However, the
district court did not rescusitate the constitutional claim despite finding discriminatory
purpose sufficient to violate the Constitution. See id. (finding that the plaintiffs met the
requirements of Village of Arlington Heights and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, two Fourteenth Amendment cases). Once again, this illustrates the limitations of
the antidiscrimination framework.
70. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 223-25.
71. Id. at 223.
72. Id. at 219.
73. See id. at 223 (criticizing the district court for disregarding North Carolina’s history
of discrimination and noting that, “[w]hile it is of course true that ‘history did not end in 1965,’
it is equally true that SL 2013-381 imposes the first meaningful restrictions on voting access
since that date .... Due to this fact, and because the legislation came into being literally within
days of North Carolina’s release from the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act,
that long-ago history bears more heavily here than it might otherwise” (citation omitted)).
2018] ELECTION LAW “FEDERALISM” 2227
evidence rather than reject the evidence altogether.74 As these cases
show, however, the courts are wildly inconsistent when it comes to
critiquing whether plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to
establish the purposeful discrimination necessary to establish the
constitutional claim.
Third, the remedies available to plaintiffs are significantly ham-
pered by the antidiscrimination framework because of federalism
concerns. Had the initial Veasey panel found that Texas engaged in
intentional discrimination,75 for example, the court could have
bailed the jurisdiction back into preclearance under section 3 of the
VRA.76 Although the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the
original panel that some of the intent evidence was infirm,77 it was
clear at the time of the original Veasey decision that there was evi-
dence of intent on the part of the Texas legislature that fell squarely
within the intentional discrimination paradigm outlined in the
Supreme Court decision of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp. This evidence included departures
from normal procedures; questionable statements and omissions
from legislators who supported the bill; the tenuousness of the
legislature’s stated purpose for passing the bill; and contemporary
examples of state-sponsored discrimination.78
The decision of the original panel to punt on the question of
discriminatory intent led to a “softening” of the Texas voter
74. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 229-32 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (stating that the district court placed too much weight on evidence that is not that
probative of discriminatory intent, but also referring to the evidence as “infirm” and
suggesting that the district court should not have relied on it at all (quoting Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982))), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
75. Note that the court remanded, and did not reverse in favor of the state, because there
was circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. See Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 493
(5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
76. Section 3 of the VRA allows a judge, upon a finding of discriminatory intent, to bail
a jurisdiction back into the preclearance regime. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (Supp. III 2016). It was
not until the subsequent en banc and district court opinions that the discriminatory purpose
holding was reinstated. See supra notes 68-69. On June 7, 2017, the district court held a
hearing on remedies, the outcome of which is still pending.
77. See Veasey, 830 F.3d at 230-31, 241.
78. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 698-702 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, rev’d in part, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017);
see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977).
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identification law, which added an affidavit option to the list of
acceptable identification, as opposed to invalidating the law in its
entirety.79 Invalidation of the law was more appropriate given the
intent evidence before the court, especially because the Department
of Justice filed a motion indicating that Texas had failed to adhere
to its promise to soften the law. Though softening might be appro-
priate to address a claim that centers on discriminatory effects, it is
arguably inappropriate when a law was passed with the intent to
discriminate, as is the case with the North Carolina law (and ar-
guably with respect to the Texas law as well). This insight is es-
pecially pertinent now, given that the Department of Justice
changed its official position and filed a motion dismissing its claim
that Texas acted with discriminatory intent.80 A court’s reluctance
to label the state as a discriminator, as well as the setbacks that can
come from a change in presidential administrations, only add to the
difficulties of providing the proper remedy for Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment violations.
Despite their vastly different outcomes, both the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits purported that they were each following the standard
established by the Supreme Court in Pullman-Standard v. Swint in
analyzing the discriminatory purpose analysis from the lower
court.81 Yet both applied a very different weighing of the facts (and
in the case of the Fifth Circuit, it confused errors of law with those
of fact) that ultimately led to different remedies in each case.82 Much
79. Veasey, 796 F.3d at 519-20.
80. United States’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Discriminatory Purpose Claim
Without Prejudice at 2, Veasey v. Abbott, No. 2:13-cv-193 (NGR) (S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2017).
81. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
82. In Veasey, both the concurrence and the dissent criticized the plurality opinion for
impermissibly reweighing the evidence in trying to determine whether discriminatory intent
was present. See Veasey, 830 F.3d at 319 (Dennis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment) (noting that “[t]he majority opinion erroneously assigns legal
errors to the district court and, in disturbing the district court’s finding of discriminatory
purpose, fails to adhere to the proper standard of review and engages in an improper
reweighing of the evidence”); id. at 320 (“The majority does not contend that the district
court’s finding of discriminatory purpose is implausible in light of the record as a whole.
Indeed, the majority opinion itself appears to acknowledge that there is a considerable
amount of evidence to support this finding. Nevertheless, the majority reverses the district
court because of purported legal errors, specifically, the district court’s reliance on evidence
that, in the majority’s view, is ‘infirm.’” (citation omitted)). Compare id. at 322 (Clement, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that the plurality “discredits ‘much of the evidence’ relied on by
the district court” but remands even though the “Supreme Court has instructed that when a
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of the back and forth in these cases, even those in which the plain-
tiffs successfully showed that the state law violated a constitutional
or statutory provision, stems from a fundamental misunderstanding
about the scope of Congress’s authority over elections and the role
of the states in organizing the machinery of federal elections.
The Elections Clause escapes the complex factual questions that
accompany any analysis of discriminatory intent, and voter identi-
fication laws that do not violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments could still exceed the scope of state authority under
the Elections Clause.83 Congress’s authority under the Clause is also
unencumbered by any requirement that the remedy be congruent
and proportional to the problem addressed, displacing contrary state
laws regardless of fit or the legislature’s motivations.84 As the next
Section shows, recent Supreme Court cases have been hobbled by
unwarranted deference to state law, much like the lower courts, and
this has had implications for racial redistricting claims under the
Reconstruction Amendments.
B. Whither Shaw Claim? The Federalism Implications of the Race
or Party Question in the Supreme Court
In recent racial redistricting cases, the Court has been espe-
cially cautious in refuting the legitimacy of partisan justifications
because of its concerns about infringing on the states’ authority over
district court’s findings as to discriminatory purpose are ‘infirm’ and ‘the record permits only
one resolution of the factual issue,’” the case should be reversed), with N.C. State Conference
of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that discriminatory
intent is present on a totality of the facts because “[c]hallengers need not show that
discriminatory purpose was the ‘sole[ ]’ or even a ‘primary’ motive for the legislation, just that
it was ‘a motivating factor.’ Discriminatory purpose ‘may often be inferred from the totality
of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 265-66 (1976))).
83. It is not entirely clear whether a voter identification law is a voter qualification
standard that falls within the scope of the state’s authority under Article I, Section 2, or a
“manner” regulation that implicates the Elections Clause. See Franita Tolson, Congressional
Authority to Protect Voting Rights After Shelby County and Arizona Inter Tribal, 13 ELECTION
L.J. 322, 323 n.6 (2014). Nonetheless, enacting an overly broad voter identification law could
exceed the scope of the state’s authority under the Elections Clause. See Tolson, supra note
39.
84. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
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elections, a failure that further highlights the constraints of the an-
tidiscrimination framework of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments. As a long-term strategy, the “politics, not race” justification,
though unsuccessful in recent cases, could see a resurgence during
the 2020 round of redistricting. The likelihood of this resurgence in-
creases substantially if the Court fails to invalidate partisan ger-
rymandering this term in Gill v. Whitford,85 or if the Court permits
states to rely on partisan justifications so long as the level of par-
tisanship falls below some inchoate and unascertainable threshold.
The potential for partisanship to legitimize an otherwise perni-
cious racial gerrymander could have deleterious effects on minority
voting rights and, perversely, render the recently resuscitated Shaw
claim toothless just as it finally stands to aid minority groups in
their quest for equal voting rights.86 In Shaw v. Reno, the Court
recognized a new cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment for legislative districts that had been
racially gerrymandered.87 Miller v. Johnson clarified the scope of the
Court’s inquiry, holding that plaintiffs must prove “that race was
the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place
a significant number of voters within or without a particular dis-
trict.”88
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Shaw did not lead to the wide-
scale invalidation of majority-minority districts as most scholars
feared, because the correlation between race and partisan affili-
ation—particularly with respect to African Americans who over-
whelmingly align with the Democratic Party’s political interests—
inadvertently created a safe harbor for legislative districts that
would otherwise run afoul of Shaw’s limit on race-conscious
redistricting.89 In Easley v. Cromartie, the Supreme Court reversed
a district court finding that race, rather than politics, was a
85. See Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (mem.) (granting stay pending the Court’s
hearing of the case), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
86. The Shaw claim has long been criticized as a cause of action created to enhance the
political power of white voters at the expense of minority voting power. See Richard L. Hasen,
Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote
in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 69-70 (2014).
87. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-44 (1993).
88. 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
89. See Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II ), 532 U.S. 234, 251-52 (2001); see also Hasen,
supra note 86, at 68-70.
2018] ELECTION LAW “FEDERALISM” 2231
predominant factor in the state’s legislative redistricting plan
because the district court ignored that voting behavior, rather than
voter registration, was a better indicator of whether the legislature
acted in a racially motivated manner in drawing the contested
district.90 The Court determined that predominantly African Amer-
ican precincts were more reliably Democratic than predominantly
white precincts;91 thus, the plaintiffs did not refute the state’s argu-
ment that the legislature was driven primarily by political consider-
ations in drawing the district.92 This approach marked a departure
from an earlier decision, Bush v. Vera, which rejected the idea that
the legislature’s desire to advance partisan goals can excuse an im-
permissible reliance on race.93
Other decisions the Supreme Court handed down that decade
reinforced Easley’s “partisan” safe harbor. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, for
example, a plurality of the Court held that partisan gerrymandering
claims are nonjusticiable because the Framers of the Constitution
anticipated that political entities would structure the districts and,
presumably, that the manipulation of district lines would take place
in our democracy.94 Although five Justices disagreed with the idea
that partisan gerrymandering claims should be nonjusticiable, eight
Justices agreed that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional
only if used excessively.95 This equivocation with respect to par-
tisanship reinforced Easley’s partisan safe harbor for race-based
redistricting, undermining the Court’s ability to address the abrid-
gment of minority rights that happened to coincide with a shared
political ideology.
The Court’s approach in these cases reflected uncertainty in the
case law that alternated between condoning and condemning the
use of partisanship in redistricting. In LULAC v. Perry, the Court
held that, while the state’s decision to redistrict mid-decade was not
prima facie evidence of an unlawful partisan gerrymander, the
state’s desire to protect incumbents can, in some circumstances, run
90. 532 U.S. at 243-44.
91. See id. at 251-52.
92. See id. at 258.
93. 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996) (plurality opinion).
94. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274-77 (2004) (plurality opinion).
95. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949-51 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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afoul of section 2 of the VRA.96 A majority of the Justices condoned
the naked partisan purpose underlying the mid-decade redistricting,
while a different majority penalized the State for taking partisan-
ship too far, holding that the dismantling of a majority-Latino
district violated section 2 of the VRA because it deprived Latinos in
the district of their political power just as they were set to exercise
it.97 Section 2 of the VRA prohibits abridgments of the right to vote
only on the basis of race, but Justice Kennedy created substantial
doctrinal confusion by failing to distinguish between the racial or
partisan motivations underlying the State’s decision to dismantle
the district.98
While the partisan safe harbor curbed much of the Shaw liti-
gation in the early 2000s, LULAC v. Perry illustrated that the Court
was willing to rely on related doctrines to bypass Vieth and police
behavior it viewed as too partisan.99 It was not until the post-2010
round of redistricting that courts began to see a reemergence of the
Shaw claim in a meaningful way. Instead of white plaintiffs com-
plaining about being “fillers” in majority African American districts,
plaintiffs now argued that states violated the mandates of Shaw by
packing African Americans into majority-minority districts to limit
their influence and, by implication, the influence of the Democratic
96. See 548 U.S. 399, 409-10 (2006). Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for himself, argued
that a state’s decision to redistrict so that its House delegation reflects the political party’s
share of the statewide vote is also legitimate. See id. at 419 (Kennedy, J.). Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito agreed that there was no partisan gerrymander, but it is
not clear if they endorsed Justice Kennedy’s reasoning. See id. at 492-93 (Roberts, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 511-12
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justices David Souter
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg rejected these portions of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, although they
agreed with Justice Kennedy “that a legislature’s decision to override a valid, court-drawn
plan mid-decade is [not] sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable standard for identifying
unconstitutional political gerrymanders” that run afoul of the rule of one person, one vote. Id.
at 423 (plurality opinion).
97. Id. at 428-35 (majority opinion).
98. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1185, 1207 (2007) (“[One possible interpretation of the Court’s holding in LULAC v. Perry is]
that the State intentionally discriminates against voters (of color?) where the State inten-
tionally deprives them of an electoral benefit to which they would otherwise be entitled for
reasons that are not constitutionally permissible.”).
99. See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010
UTAH L. REV. 859, 866-67.
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Party.100 Whereas early Shaw cases struggled with conceptualizing
the harm from racial gerrymandering,101 these recent cases have
forced the Supreme Court to more directly confront the “race or par-
ty” question.
The reemergence of the Shaw claim forces the Court to confront
the question it skirted for far too long: Why dance around the race
or partisanship question for almost two decades instead of directly
addressing the issues that emerge when the two categories overlap?
Not surprisingly, the answer lies in the creation of the Shaw claim
itself, which has never resolved the problem of racial gerrymander-
ing because the Court has been unwilling to circumscribe the states’
authority over elections by first, fully vindicating antidiscrimination
norms, and second, by treating partisanship as inherently suspect.
After all, partisanship that harms a racial group cannot be valid
simply because the legislature’s reasons are more partisan than
racial.102
On the first point, Shaw and its progeny failed to definitively re-
solve whether compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws was
sufficient to justify such districting.103 This failure has exacerbated
the conflict between the mandates of the VRA, which sometimes
require the creation of majority-minority districts as a remedy, and
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, which eschews
race consciousness in legislative redistricting.
In Bethune-Hill v. Virginia, for example, the Supreme Court
rejected the lower court’s argument that there must be a conflict
between traditional redistricting criteria and race “that leads to a
subordination of the former” in order to prevail on a Shaw claim.104
But the Court sustained the lines drawn for District 75 against a
racial gerrymandering challenge, a district that was 55 percent
African American, despite dubious evidence that the district needed
this many voters of color to elect their candidate of choice.105 This
approach created tension with an earlier decision, Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, which rejected a reading of
100. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472-73, 1477-78 (2017).
101. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
102. Tolson, supra note 99, at 867-71.
103. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
104. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 796, 797-99 (2017).
105. See id. at 800-02.
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section 5 that would facilitate this type of packing in majority-
minority districts.106 Instead, the Court was more concerned about
intruding on the state’s authority over elections: “‘The law cannot
insist that a state legislature, when redistricting, determine pre-
cisely what percent minority population § 5 demands’.... Holding
otherwise would afford state legislatures too little breathing
room.”107
This need to give the states “breathing room” has likewise
rendered it unlikely that the Court will prevent the state from
relying on partisan justifications in redistricting. In Cooper v.
Harris, the Court once again dealt with the constitutionality of
congressional Districts 1 and 12—the very same districts that were
at issue in the Shaw v. Reno round of litigation.108 Prior to the 2010
round of redistricting, neither district was a majority-minority
district, and District 1, in particular, was substantially under-
populated.109 Post-2010, both districts became majority African
American, with the State claiming that District 1 was reconfigured
in order to avoid liability under section 2 of the VRA and that the
District 12 lines were altered for partisan reasons.110 The Court
rejected these arguments, noting that, with respect to District 1, any
potential section 2 plaintiffs could not establish the racial bloc
voting necessary to sustain the statutory claim.111 This position is
understandable, given that the State’s interpretation would force
it to draw majority-minority districts wherever possible, even in the
absence of racial bloc voting, which would put section 2 on a col-
lision course with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.112
106. 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1272-74 (2015) (holding that section 5 of the VRA did not require
states to maintain the same percentage of African Americans in majority-minority districts
as had existed in the prior plan).
107. Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 802 (quoting Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at
1273) (“The question is whether the State had ‘good reasons’ to believe a 55% BVAP floor was
necessary to avoid liability.”).
108. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465-66 (2017).
109. Id. at 1466.
110. See id. at 1470-73.
111. See id. at 1470.
112. Unlike the effectively defunct provisions of section 5, the Court’s position that
compliance with section 2 triggers strict scrutiny ultimately could prove to be harmful to
section 2’s constitutionality, but that is an issue for another day. See Bartlett v. Strickland,
556 U.S. 1, 23-25 (2009).
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The State’s arguments concerning District 12 were much more
difficult for the Court to resolve, ultimately leaving in place much
of Easley v. Cromartie’s partisan safe harbor. In Cooper, the State
argued that its decision to reconfigure District 12 was strictly
partisan113—a contention that the Court rejected because of the
direct evidence of racial motivation, including statements by state
legislators that District 12 was designed to avoid retrogression
under section 5 of the VRA;114 conflicting testimony by the State’s
expert witness, Dr. Hofeller, about whether he ignored race in
crafting the district;115 and an expert report by Dr. Ansolabehere
that found “a black voter was three to four times more likely than
a white voter to cast his ballot within District 12’s borders.”116
Nonetheless, the Cooper majority did not firmly and unequivo-
cally refute that states can assert a partisan-based defense to racial
gerrymandering. Because the evidence of racial motivation was
substantial, the Court rejected arguments by dissenters that the
plaintiffs, in order to prevail in a redistricting dispute where race
and partisan affiliation correlate, must produce an alternative map
that allows the state to achieve its partisan objectives without the
same reliance on race.117 In cases based on circumstantial instead
of direct evidence of racial considerations, however, the Court im-
plied that the legislature could prevail, distinguishing the present
case on the grounds that “the plaintiffs’ introduction of mostly direct
and some circumstantial evidence ... gave the District Court a suffi-
cient basis, sans any map, to resolve the race-or-politics question.”118
Absent such direct evidence, partisanship, no matter how toxic or
how pervasive, can be a legitimate motivation for a redistricting
plan, such that plaintiffs have to come forward with an alternate
map in cases of circumstantial evidence. Cooper importantly ignores
that, just as the use of race can be a facial classification that runs
113. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1473 (“According to the State’s version of events, Senator Rucho,
Representative Lewis, and Dr. Hofeller moved voters in and out of the district as part of a
‘strictly’ political gerrymander, without regard to race.”).
114. Id. at 1475.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1476-77.
117. See id. at 1478-81.
118. Id. at 1479.
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afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, so too can the excessive use of
partisanship “abridge or deny” the right to vote.119
Given this reasoning, the majority is not too far off from Justice
Alito’s separate concurrence and dissent, which embraced the notion
that the state can be partisan in its sovereign capacity, and
therefore can legitimately enact a plan that has a negative impact
on people of color who vote for the opposition.120 Instead, the
disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in this case
really boils down to an evidentiary issue: When must plaintiffs
produce an alternate map to prevail on a racial gerrymandering
claim? As Justice Alito argued in Cooper, the alternative map re-
quirement has an important institutional and federalism dimension
that effectively trumps the rights of minority voters: “[I]f a court
mistakes a political gerrymander for a racial gerrymander, it ille-
gitimately invades a traditional domain of state authority, usurping
the role of a State’s elected representatives. This does harm to both
the proper role of the Judiciary and the powers reserved to the
States under the Constitution.”121
Unlike the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, there is no
requirement under the Elections Clause that plaintiffs disentangle
the myriad motivations for why a plan was enacted. A state, for
example, can exceed the scope of its redistricting authority under
the Clause by adopting rules that unduly influence the outcome of
an election, regardless if enacted for racial or partisan reason.122 In
119. Tolson, supra note 56, at 476-77 (arguing that partisanship can abridge the right to
vote under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Michael S. Kang, Gerry-
mandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV.
351 (2017).
120. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1487-88 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). As Justice Alito explicitly acknowledges,
[I]t is well known that state legislative majorities very often attempt to gain an
electoral advantage through [partisan gerrymandering,] ... and while some
might find it distasteful, “[o]ur prior decisions have made clear that a juris-
diction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so hap-
pens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if
the State were conscious of the fact.”
Id. at 1488 (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)).
121. Id. at 1490.
122. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832-35 (1995); see also Jamal
Greene, Note, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE L.J.
1021, 1028-30 (2005).
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addition, Congress does not have to yield to concerns over the
sovereign authority of the states when regulating the times, places,
and manner of federal elections. Yet recent Supreme Court case law
has failed to fully theorize the Elections Clause as a provision that
eschews state sovereignty, limiting the Clause’s ability to supple-
ment federal power under the Reconstruction Amendments. As the
next Part shows, this failure potentially subjects the Elections
Clause to the same federalism limitations as the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.
II. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AND THE IMPRUDENT FEDERALISM OF
THE ARIZONA CASES
As I have argued in prior work, the Elections Clause stands as an
additional source of authority for federal antidiscrimination laws,
especially the VRA.123 The Clause, although it explicitly applies to
procedural regulations that govern federal elections, can, in some
circumstances, limit the states’ ability to enact legislation that
abridges the right to vote.124 Congress also has enacted legislation
pursuant to the Clause that likely would be unconstitutional had
that body relied on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
alone.125 The Elections Clause historically has been important in
supplementing the Reconstruction Amendments as a source of au-
thority to combat racial discrimination in voting.126 But using these
sources concurrently has increased the risk that the Clause would
be similarly limited by the federalism concerns that have hobbled
enforcement of the Amendments. Both the courts and scholars often
confuse the decentralized nature of the Elections Clause with fed-
eralism, even though the Clause is incompatible with the concept of
“dual sovereignty” upon which the United States system of feder-
alism is based.127 While the authority that the states exercise
123. See generally Tolson, supra note 6, at 1197-1202.
124. See id. at 1212.
125. See id. at 1238-40.
126. See id. at 1197-1202.
127. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819) (“In America, the
powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the
States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither
sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other.”). Of course, this is not the only
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pursuant to the Clause can arguably further important federalism
end goals,128 state authority under the Clause is best characterized
not as sovereign, but as decentralized and autonomous. Under this
characterization, states “may be immune from certain norms but are
not exempt from all intervention from the federal government.”129 As
definition of federalism. Edward Purcell has persuasively argued that federalism is dynamic
in “that the Constitution neither gave the federal structure any single proper shape as an
operating system of government nor mandated any particular and timeless balance among
its components.” EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 7 (2007). Thus, new theories of feder-
alism emerge “as the social and cultural dynamics of American politics ... change drastically.”
Id. at 179; see also id. at 178-81 (discussing theories of dual, cooperative, and competitive
federalism, all of which “reflected the dominant needs, values, practices, and politics of the
respective centuries that embraced them most fully”); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 41, at 22
(defining “true federalism” as a structure in which “geographical subunits are allowed to
establish their own goals and maintain their own values”). In addition, not all of the new
theories of federalism treat sovereignty as their focal point. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, The
Authority for Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW &
HIST. REV. 451, 455-56, 458-59 (2010) (viewing “federalism’s central ideas” as “multilayered
authority, a substantive (as opposed to territorial or personal) approach to jurisdiction, a
central government with a brief and identity distinct from the combined wills of the com-
ponent states,” which necessitated the creation of “another institution—the judiciary—to
mediate [disputes] between state and general governments”). But to the extent that the Court
has, in accordance with its “federalism revival,” tried to reinvigorate conceptions of “dual
federalism” and “state sovereignty,” then the Elections Clause is in tension with the sover-
eignty-based narrative underlying our system of federalism as advocated by eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century politicians. See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Recon-
struction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 41-42 (finding among the tenants of
“dual federalism” advocated by politicians of this era was “that each of these governments had
a complete, independent structure [confirmed by the Tenth Amendment] with which to ex-
ercise its powers and could not require the other to administer its laws”). The Supreme Court
still protects this conception of “state sovereignty.” See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 924-25 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot commandeer state officials without un-
dermining residual state sovereignty); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). 
128. See Tolson, supra note 99, 862-64; Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-44 (1954) (describing the states’ role “in the com-
position and selection of the central government” as an important device that “serve[s] the
ends of federalism”).
129. Tolson, supra note 6, at 1248. Compare Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2004) (defining sovereignty “as the notion that state
governments should be unaccountable for violations of federal norms” and autonomy “as the
ability of states to govern”), with Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 813, 816 (1998) (defining autonomy as immunity from federal norms). One such norm
that has developed is the presumptive validity of state law under Elections Clause, but this
norm has erroneously contributed to a view of the Clause as embracing a federalist structure
in which states exercise sovereign authority. This norm emerged due to the absence of
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Bernard Bailyn observed almost fifty years ago, sovereignty is “the
notion that there must reside somewhere in every political unit a
single, undivided, final power, higher in legal authority than any
other power, subject to no law, a law unto itself.”130 States are not
sovereign when legislating pursuant to the Clause because they
govern entirely at the pleasure of Congress, depriving states of the
final policy-making authority that is the hallmark of sovereign
power.131
In theory, dual federalism assumes that both federal and state
governments retain final policy-making authority in their respec-
tive spheres, but the not-so-background assumption in the Supreme
Court’s case law is that the states need protection from an overly
aggressive and imperialistic federal government.132 In the Court’s
view, post-New Deal developments negated the states’ properly or-
dained role in the national political process, prompting the Court to
adopt a series of federalism principles to protect state sovereignty.133
uniform federal legislation governing federal elections for the first half century of the
country’s existence, and not from a reluctance to displace state law once Congress has made
the decision to act (such that a clear statement rule or a presumption against preemption
would be warranted). See Tolson, supra note 99, at 885-88.
130. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198 (50th
Anniversary ed. 2017). 
131. Tolson, supra note 6, at 1248 (“Decentralization is the best way of describing a policy
area in which states are autonomous rather than sovereign .... As such, the ability of Congress
to preempt state regulatory regimes reflects that the founders were not overly concerned with
protecting state sovereignty in this respect because, if this had been a concern, state authority
would be final.”); cf. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 41, at 23 (“[A] common—if not essential—
feature of federalism is that there are significant constraints on the national government’s
ability to interfere with subunit policies for managing and controlling the local governments
within their borders.”); Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 215, 215 (1918) (“By federalism is meant, of course, that system of political
order in which powers of government are separated and distinguished and in which these
powers are distributed among governments, each government having its quota of authority
and each its distinct sphere of activity.”).
132. See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2024-25 (2009) (reading the Court’s federalism cases
as enforcing a general federalism norm that recognizes “implied limitations in federal power
that are traceable to some form of historically reconstructed original understanding of the
appropriate federal-state balance”). 
133. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950)
(noting that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence during the New Deal is in tension with
“certain postulates or axioms of constitutional interpretation closely touching the Federal
System,” including the postulate that “[w]ithin their respective spheres the two centers of
government are ‘sovereign’ and hence ‘equal’”). 
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For example, the Court does not automatically assume that
Congress intends to apply federal law to the states in areas of con-
current regulation, utilizing a clear statement rule even though
Congress could subject states to federal regulation if it so chooses.134
Similarly, the presumption against preemption does not confront
the issue of whether Congress can preempt the relevant state law;
instead, the presumption treats state law as valid absent evidence
to the contrary.135 In both scenarios, the Court concedes that Con-
gress could act, but refuses to subject state actors to federal reg-
ulation or displace state law absent explicit congressional intent.136
And other federalism principles, such as the anticommandeering
doctrine,137 the constitutional avoidance canon,138 and, more recent-
ly, the equal sovereignty principle,139 insulate the states from feder-
al authority. But there has not been much sustained effort to protect
federal power and prevent overreaching by the states using similar
principles.140 This oversight is noticeable with respect to the
134. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-61 (1991).
135. See Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2271 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The
presumption against pre-emption applies with full force when Congress legislates in a ‘field
which States have traditionally occupied.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947))).
136. See id. at 2272 (“[W]hen Congress believes that some overriding national interest
justifies federal regulation, it has the power to ‘make or alter’ state laws specifying ‘Times,
Places and Manner’ of federal elections.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1)).
137. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2181-83 (1998) (arguing that the constitutional text and
history supports a ban on the commandeering of state legislatures, but suggesting that there
should be a more nuanced approach to the commandeering of the state executive).
138. One of the Court’s most recent efforts to preserve a federal statute using the
constitutional avoidance canon led to the statute’s invalidation a short four years later,
suggesting that the Court will not give Congress much time to correct perceived constitutional
defects in federal statutory schemes where state sovereignty is at issue. Compare
NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203-06 (2009), with Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612,
2621-27 (2013).
139. See Shelby County, 133 S.Ct. at 2623-24.
140. See Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 541-42, 624
(2012) (describing the anticommandeering rule as “establish[ing] jurisdictional limits on the
state and federal sovereigns by prohibiting the phenomena of commandeering” and arguing
that “[t]he state takeover of federal immigration database screening protocols effectually
commandeers federal resources to serve state ends ... [and] enables another form of reverse-
commandeering: the usurpation of federal enforcement discretion because state authorities
can now make competing choices about where, when, and how vigorously to enforce the
federal laws mirrored in their state statutes” (emphasis added)). One notable exception is
where issues of field preemption arise, and the Court protects federal authority from state
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Elections Clause, in which Congress, by virtue of its authority to
“make or alter” state regulations, determines the scope of state
power but—with few exceptions—still must battle against norms
that implicitly favor state regulation.141 
Despite the distinction between the sovereign authority the
Clause delegates to Congress and the autonomy the states retain
over structuring the procedures of federal elections, the Court has
not exempted the Clause from its tendency to enforce federalism at
all costs, with little regard for the Clause’s text, structure, and
purpose. An initial read of recent case law might give the opposite
impression, however. In Arizona Inter Tribal, the Court held that
the NVRA, which requires that individuals affirm their citizenship
status in order to register to vote in federal elections, preempted
an Arizona voter registration law that required documentary proof
of citizenship—instead of affirmation—to register to vote in both
state and federal elections.142 The Court rejected Arizona’s argu-
ment that the presumption against preemption applied to congres-
sional legislation, like the NVRA, passed pursuant to the Elections
Clause.143 Any congressional power exercised under the Clause, in
the Court’s view, is a preemption of state legislation, making the
presumption unnecessary.144
The Elections Clause’s division of authority was once again front
and center two years later in Arizona IRC, but this time the Arizona
legislature and voters were at odds over which entity was the
encroachment by prohibiting states from regulating in a particular substantive area. See, e.g.,
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 474 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Hughes
v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). Even in cases involving issues of field
preemption, there is still substantial concern about preserving the vitality of state
sovereignty. See generally Matthew R. Christiansen, Comment, FPA Preemption in the 21st
Century, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1-3 (2016) (previewing the Supreme Court case of PPL
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, which involves the Federal Power Act, and arguing that the
Court should narrow its field preemption doctrine to avoid “impairing the dual-federalist
model that is the heart of the FPA”).
141. Tolson, supra note 6, at 1258 (noting that the Court’s “voting rights jurisprudence
presupposes that the states still retain a large amount of ‘sovereignty’ over elections, leaving
room for the Court to characterize the federal/state relationship over elections as one of
shared power instead of viewing the state as subordinate to federal authority. The view of
electoral authority as ‘shared’ has led the Court to defer more to the states over the matter
of elections”).
142. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2252-60 (2013).
143. See id. at 2256-57.
144. Id. at 2257 n.6.
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“legislature” for the purpose of congressional redistricting.145 The
Court upheld an Arizona law adopted through direct democracy that
delegated the state legislature’s redistricting authority to an inde-
pendent commission.146 The Court rejected the argument that the
Clause, which states that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner” of feder-
al elections “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof,” was designed “to restrict the way States enact legislation,”
and instead found that its “dominant purpose ... was to empower
Congress to override state election rules.”147 In an alternate holding,
the Court found that the State’s redistricting scheme was permitted
by a federal statute, 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c),148 which lists several require-
ments for congressional redistricting in the event that a state fails
to adopt a redistricting plan.149 This statute refers to a valid state
redistricting plan as one that is adopted “in the manner provided by
the laws thereof,” which is a change from earlier language that re-
quired redistricting “by a State’s ‘legislature.’”150
On the surface, the Court’s description of the Elections Clause in
both Arizona Inter Tribal and Arizona IRC defies the dual sover-
eignty narrative because the Court emphasizes congressional power.
This approach is inconsistent with the traditional federalism frame-
work that delegates to each sovereign an exclusive sphere of au-
thority, insulated from interference from one another. The majority
opinion in Arizona Inter Tribal, in particular, adopted a broad view
of congressional authority over federal elections, at one point
describing this authority as a “paramount” and noting that it “may
be exercised at any time, and to any extent which [Congress] deems
expedient.”151 The Court therefore declined to apply the presumption
against preemption, maintaining that federalism concerns in this
145. See Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658-59 (2015).
146. See id. at 2677.
147. Id. at 2659, 2672.
148. Id. at 2659, 2666.
149. Id. at 2669 n.19. (noting that 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) requires “that Representatives be elected
‘by districts composed of a contiguous and compact territory, and containing as nearly as
practicable an equal number of inhabitants,’ and that the districts ‘be equal to the number of
Representatives to which [the] State may be entitled in Congress, no district electing more
than one Representative’” (quoting Act of Aug. 8, 1911, Ch. 5 §§ 3-4, 37 Stat. 14)).
150. Id. at 2669 (emphasis omitted).
151. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253-54 (2013) (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371, 392 (1880)). 
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context are “somewhat weaker” than in its Supremacy Clause cases
because the Elections Clause gives Congress the power to displace
any elements of a preexisting state regulatory regime that deal with
the procedure of federal elections.152 Similarly, in Arizona IRC, the
Court not only held that the Elections Clause does not constrain
lawmaking by the people, provided that the state constitution has
endorsed direct democracy, but also gave significant weight to the
fact that section 2a(c) permitted the people of Arizona, through
ballot initiative, to delegate the state’s redistricting authority to an
independent body.153
Once one peels back the layers of the Arizona decisions, however,
the differences between these cases and the Court’s federalism ju-
risprudence are revealed as differences of form rather than sub-
stance. In these cases, the Court invoked similar concerns about
state sovereignty that previously limited the reach of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.154 For example, the contention
in Arizona Inter Tribal that every exercise of congressional author-
ity under the Clause is a preemption of state law may be ideologi-
cally linked to the state action doctrine advanced in the Civil Rights
Cases.155 As the latter cases recognized, Congress secures the rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
by way of prohibition against State laws and State proceedings
affecting those rights and privileges, and by power given ... to
legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect;
[but] such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such
152. See id. at 2257 (noting that “the States’ role in regulating congressional elec-
tions—while weighty and worthy of respect—has always existed subject to the express qualifi-
cation that it ‘terminates according to federal law’” (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff ’s Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001))). While the Supremacy Clause is considered a federalism
provision—allowing Congress to preempt state law in the event of any conflicts— congression-
al authority under the Elections Clause is much broader, allowing Congress to independently
make law. See infra Part III.C.1.
153. Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2670 (“So long as a State has ‘redistricted in the manner
provided by the law thereof ’—as Arizona did by utilizing the independent commission
procedure called for by its Constitution—the resulting redistricting plan becomes the
presumptively governing map.” (emphasis added)).
154. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621, 2622 n.1 (2013).
155. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883).
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supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the
correction of their operation and effect.156
By making state law a prerequisite to federal action, the Court’s
decision in Arizona Inter Tribal could be viewed as a similar
attempt to preserve the sovereignty of the states at the expense of
congressional power, deemed by the Court to be “paramount.”157
Arizona IRC also subordinated federal authority to state power
in adopting an expansive reading of the term “legislature,” and
declining to treat federal authorization in 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) as a
necessary prerequisite before the state’s redistricting authority
could be delegated to an independent commission.158 In other areas
in which federal power is paramount, the Court has taken congres-
sional silence to be a form of acquiescence in the state regulatory
scheme.159 When Congress has spoken, however, the Court deter-
mines whether federal law displaces state authority or if Congress
has expressly ratified the state regulatory scheme.160
Properly framed, these cases are beholden to the Court’s state-
centered federalism jurisprudence that emphasizes the values of
federalism as benefits that inure to the state; reinforces a status
quo in which state law is presumptively valid; and closely scruti-
nizes legislative intrusions by the federal government. As the Court
stated in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
[Federalism] assures a decentralized government that will be
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society;
it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
156. Id. (emphasis added); see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875).
157. One might argue that the Court did not intend to impose a state action requirement
for the Elections Clause. Instead, the majority may have been more concerned with limiting
congressional authority to displacing only the times, places, and manner of federal elections
that states may (or may not) enact in order to cabin off voter qualification standards from
federal power. I discuss the flaws of both of these interpretations in Part III.
158. See Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2699 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s
defense of direct democracy as “faux federalism”).
159. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
160. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012) (finding all but section
2(b) of the Arizona immigration law, which “requires state officers to conduct a status check
during the course of an authorized, lawful detention” to be preempted because there was no
“showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives”).
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government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.161
More recently, United States v. Windsor affirmed the state-cen-
tric vision of federalism, noting that the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which defined marriage as between a man and a woman
for purposes of federal law, impermissibly “rejects the long-estab-
lished precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of mar-
riage are uniform for all married couples within each State.”162 The
Court acknowledged the myriad ways in which federal law has
helped define the substance of the right to marriage by according
benefits to the union in its own way, which is a constitutional use of
federal authority.163 Additionally, it was not that state and federal
law could not live harmoniously—DOMA defined marriage for
purposes of federal, not state, law. Instead, the Court privileged the
state definition of marriage, even for purposes of executing a federal
law that might have benefitted from a uniform definition of mar-
riage, because authority over marriage had long resided within the
sovereign authority of the states.164
In contrast, the Elections Clause prioritizes federal law, despite
the substantial authority that states exercise over federal elections,
because “[t]he dominant purpose of the Elections Clause, the his-
torical record bears out, was to empower Congress to override state
election rules” to “insur[e] against the possibility that a State would
refuse to provide for the election of representatives to the Federal
Congress.”165 Moreover, the Clause “act[s] as a safeguard against
manipulation of electoral rules by politicians and factions in the
States to entrench themselves or place their interests over those of
the electorate.”166 This Article’s focus on preserving the legitimacy
of federal elections captures these variant strands that the Court
161. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
162. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
163. See id. at 2689-90.
164. See id. at 2691 (“[T]he states, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, possessed
full power over the subject of marriage and divorce ... [and] the Constitution delegated no
authority to the Government of the United States on the subject of marriage and divorce.”
(alteration and omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S.
562, 575 (1906))).
165. Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2015).
166. Id.
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and historical record have identified as the purpose behind the
adoption of the Elections Clause—the Framers’ concerns about par-
tisan entrenchment potentially marginalizing the electorate; their
overwhelming desire to ensure the continued health and vitality of
federal elections; and their surprising willingness to give the states
a central and ongoing role in the composition of the federal gov-
ernment—to have federal officials elected through a process that is
legitimized through criteria adopted in light of all of these consid-
erations.167
The Elections Clause embodies principles that ensure the le-
gitimacy of federal elections, contrary to the state centered values
that are the focus of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. The Court
must interpret the allocation of power between the two levels of gov-
ernment in a manner that best promotes this goal. First, Congress
usually defers to state law governing federal elections, but Congress
has been especially deferential if the law furthers the Elections
Clause values of respecting popular sovereignty while ensuring fi-
nality and ease of administration. Second, the Clause’s focus on con-
gressional, rather than state, sovereignty is embodied by Congress’s
authority to “alter” state law where appropriate, “make” law com-
pletely independent of the state’s legal regime, and “commandeer”
state officials to implement federal law.168 This structure permits
Congress to implement a complete code for federal elections, which
is an invaluable source of authority, particularly if states have
jeopardized the health and vitality of federal elections in some way.
These values, as well as the structure of the Clause, are integral to
its overarching purpose of ensuring the legitimacy of federal
elections, much of which turns on the electorate’s belief that the
system is working.
167. Tolson, supra note 6, at 1226 (“The congressional veto in the Elections Clause was
linked to the then-prevailing notion that the national government would be insulated from
the passions of the people in a way that the states were not and probably should not be. The
absence of sovereignty in the Clause, therefore, was viewed by the founding generation as a
structural safeguard against partisan zeal and tyranny. The veto also reflected the delegates’
fear that the states, had they been in complete control of elections, could have used this power
to the detriment of their citizens, who would have little recourse.” (footnote omitted)); see also
ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-
1850, at 113-23 (1987) (detailing the partisanship and the big state/small state disputes
underlying the controversy in large versus district elections since the founding).
168. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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III. PRESERVING THE LEGITIMACY OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS
THROUGH ELECTIONS CLAUSE VALUES
Similar to our system of federalism, the Elections Clause can pro-
mote democratic outcomes by deferring to the states and placing a
premium on popular sovereignty. But in practice, the Clause’s val-
ues cannot be divorced from federal power, exercises of which are
often counter-majoritarian in prioritizing finality and ease of admin-
istration over citizen participation.169 The Court has had difficulty
in balancing these competing, and sometimes conflicting, factors,
leading it to default to the baseline of state sovereignty in most
cases.
For example, the Arizona Inter Tribal Court acknowledged, but
still struggled with the notion of congressional sovereignty, taking
every opportunity to reaffirm a governing role for the states. For
its part, the Arizona IRC decision reflected that Congress’s scope of
authority under the Elections Clause is influenced by democratic
norms inherent in constitutional provisions that have expanded
individual access to our governing institutions.170 Nonetheless, this
important insight was overshadowed by a glaring error in the ma-
jority opinion that undermined one of the key attributes of con-
gressional sovereignty inherent in the Clause. The Court, by relying
on 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) as an alternate holding, overlooked the indis-
pensability of congressional approval to all procedural questions
surrounding federal elections.171
The majority’s analysis should have emphasized that sovereign-
ty lies with Congress, such that state law is presumptively valid
only if Congress permits it to be. For example, in Arizona v. United
169. For example, the NVRA was designed to increase the opportunities for voter
registration, but not at all costs. Under current case law, states can impose proof of
citizenship requirements as a prerequisite to voting if the state provides evidence that the
NVRA interferes with the administration of their voter qualification requirements. See
Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013).
170. Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2672.
171. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) is evidence that Congress has ratified the use of independent redis-
tricting commissions and as such, it is indispensable to the Court’s decision that the state is
permitted to use them. Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644-45 (1998); Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81
(1978).
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States, the Court upheld the majority of Arizona’s immigration law
because of its consistency with the federal scheme, not because
states have some type of sovereign authority to regulate immigra-
tion independent of federal law.172 Similarly, Congress defers to
state lawmaking procedures, not because the states are sovereign,
but because it respects popular sovereignty and promotes adminis-
trative ease. Both are important Elections Clause values that Con-
gress itself recognized in adopting section 2a(c).173 As this Part
shows, the juxtaposition between popular sovereignty, competent
election administration, and congressional sovereignty makes these
values distinct from any value of federalism currently protected by
the courts or favored by the legal scholarship. These values are
designed to further the Clause’s overarching purpose of electoral
legitimacy, but the Court has ignored them, resulting in an im-
permissibly narrow view of federal authority.
A. Elections Clause Value: Preserving the Legitimacy of Federal
Elections Through Respect for Popular Sovereignty
So where do these Elections Clause values come from? The first
of these values—respect for popular sovereignty—derives from con-
stitutional changes to our political system, starting with our found-
ing documents but extending through several amendments that
increased the political power of the people during the twentieth
century, including, most notably, the Seventeenth Amendment.174
The Apportionment Act of 1911 (the 1911 Act), the predecessor to
section 2a(c) at issue in Arizona IRC, is especially instructive
172. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012).
173. See Nathaniel Persily et al., When Is a Legislature Not a Legislature? When Voters
Regulate Elections by Initiative, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 696 (2016) (“As for platitudes about
popular sovereignty, the Framers instilled in the Elections Clause the notion that control of
elections should be conducted by the institution most representative of the people.”).
174. As the Arizona IRC Court noted, in resolving whether,
[a]bsent congressional authorization, ... the Elections Clause preclude[s] the
people of Arizona from creating a commission operating independently of the
state legislature to establish congressional districts[.] The history and purpose
of the Clause weigh heavily against such preclusion, as does the animating
principle of our Constitution that the people themselves are the originating source
of all the powers of government.
135 S. Ct. at 2671 (emphasis added). 
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here.175 In its initial form, the Act referred to state “legislatures” as
the entity responsible for redistricting, but it was enacted during
the Progressive Era, which saw an increase in ballot initiatives and
referenda, the use of primary elections, and ultimately, the adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment.176 Progressives, who sought to mar-
ginalize the political elites who had created doubt and uncertainty
about the outcome of many elections, argued that state legislatures
should not have the power to select United States senators because
the legislatures conspired with the business community regarding
appointments.177 They believed that average people should become
directly involved with the political process to mitigate this corrup-
tion.178 In response to these concerns, Congress altered the language
of the 1911 Act to encompass state laws enacted through ballot ini-
tiatives to be responsive to the popular sovereignty concerns driving
the Progressive movement.179
During this period, the overhaul of the political process high-
lighted divisions over the question of the entity with which sover-
eignty lies, but arguably, Congress’s embrace of direct democracy
through the 1911 Act, when interpreted in light of the Seventeenth
Amendment, rejected a formalistic conception of state sovereignty
in favor of a broader definition that encompassed the people of the
state.180 Even though the Amendment specifically dealt with the
election of senators, its adoption, along with the 1911 Act, suggests
that the change in the nature of state sovereignty to be inclusive of
the populace—at least in the context of federal elections—was broad
and wholesale.
175. See Apportionment Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 62-5, 37 Stat. 13.
176. See id.
177. Cf. Ben Hovland, Comment, Championed by Progressives and William U’Ren: Can
Oregon Give the Ballot Initiative to the People Again?, 85 OR. L. REV. 275, 279 (2006).
178. See id.
179. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (2012) (“[I]f there is an increase in the number of Represen-
tatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at
large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State.”
(emphasis added)), with Apportionment Act of 1911 § 4 (“That in case of an increase in the
number of Representatives in any State under this apportionment such additional Represen-
tative or Representatives shall be elected by the State at large and the other Representatives
by the districts now prescribed by law until such State shall be redistricted in the manner
provided by the laws thereof and in accordance with the rules enumerated in section three of
this Act.” (emphasis added)).
180. Cf. Persily et al., supra note 173, at 696.
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Congress’s reliance on the Elections Clause to make allowances
for popular sovereignty is in line with the Framers’ desire to use the
constitutional structure as a safeguard for individual liberty. As I
have argued in a prior article, the Framers were willing to give
Congress veto authority over state election laws, as opposed to all
state laws, as a compromise position that allowed Congress to weigh
in on a limited, but very important circumstance—voting and rep-
resentation.181 But, importantly, the congressional veto was also a
safeguard for the people:
The Elections Clause furthered fears that the Constitution
created an all-powerful national government that would intro-
duce tyranny, despotism, and a governing aristocracy. To ad-
dress these concerns, Federalists often drew parallels between
the rights that free men surrendered to their governments to
protect liberty and the power that states relinquished to the
central authority, also viewed as necessary to protect freedom.
In other words, just as individuals had to give up some of their
individual liberty to state governments in order to secure peace-
ful enjoyment of those liberties, so too did states have to sur-
render some of their power to the federal government for the
same purpose—to protect the people. The congressional veto in
the Elections Clause, from this perspective, was simply another
layer of protection for the people in return for the states sur-
rendering their final policymaking authority over elections to
the federal government.182
The Clause’s origins as an additional safeguard for individual
liberty show that the Arizona IRC case was not, as the dissenters
contend, about Congress’s ability through section 2a(c) to unilater-
ally enlarge its own power by changing the meaning of the term
“legislature.”183 Properly seen, the case was about the less controver-
sial issue of whether the Court should interpret Congress’s power
to “make or alter” election regulations to permit Congress to shift
decision-making authority under the Clause from one state entity
to another in the name of popular sovereignty. In answering this
question, it quickly becomes clear that there can be no independent
181. See Tolson, supra note 6, at 1223.
182. Id. at 1224 (footnote omitted).
183. See Arizona IRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677-78 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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analysis of the meaning of “legislature” without consideration of
federal law.
To understand this point, pretend that Congress did not sanction
redistricting by independent commission in section 2a(c), but
instead prohibited it. The Court would then have had to directly
confront the question of whether Congress, through federal statute,
could prevent a state from using an independent commission for
congressional redistricting. It is pretty clear that the answer would
depend on the Court’s interpretation of Congress’s power to “make
or alter” state regulations. As it stands, the statute plays very little
role in the outcome because, by permitting direct democracy, it
simply reinforces what the Court had already concluded with
respect to the meaning of the term “legislature”: that the term
embodies whatever prescriptions for lawmaking are in the state
constitution.184 But the Court’s approach unnecessarily aggrandizes
state power at Congress’s expense by leaving unresolved fundamen-
tal questions about federal power under the Elections Clause.
The majority’s privileging of state law in this way is deeply ironic
given that it did not prevent four dissenters from criticizing the
decision as insufficiently protective of state sovereignty, at least to
the extent that ideal is represented by the state legislature. As
Chief Justice Roberts cautioned:
[T]he majority’s reading of Section 2a(c) as a statute approving
the lines drawn by the Commission would seemingly authorize
Congress to alter the Elections Clause. The first part of the
Elections Clause gives state legislatures the power to prescribe
regulations regarding the times, places, and manner of elections;
184. See id. at 2671 (majority opinion) (declining to resolve the constitutionality of section
2a(c) because “[a]ny uncertainty about the import of § 2a(c) ... is resolved by our holding that
the Elections Clause permits regulation of congressional elections by initiative”); id. at 2687-
88 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Section 2a(c) establishes a number of default rules that govern
the States’ manner of electing representatives ‘[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner
provided by the law thereof.’ Section 2a(c) is therefore ‘inapplicable unless the state
legislature, and state and federal courts, have all failed to redistrict’ the State. Here, the
Commission has redistricted the State ‘in the manner provided by the law thereof.’ So by its
terms, Section 2a(c) does not come into play in this case.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 275 (2003) (plurality opinion))). Even if Chief Justice Roberts
is correct that section 2a(c) does not apply because the Commission redistricted the State, the
statute still stands as persuasive evidence that Congress permits states to delegate their
authority to an independent commission pursuant to the Clause.
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the second part of the Clause gives Congress the power to “make
or alter such Regulations.” There is a difference between making
or altering election regulations prescribed by the state legisla-
ture and authorizing an entity other than the state legislature to
prescribe election regulations.185
Both the majority and the dissenters ignore, however, that section
2a(c) confirms that not only does Congress have the authority to
determine the procedures and the institution through which states
can enact the times, places, and manner of federal elections, but
also the statute that the Court billed as an alternate holding defin-
itively resolved the main issue of the case—whether states can re-
district by independent commission.
Cases decided in the wake of the 1911 Act and the Seventeenth
Amendment confirm that the reallocation of redistricting authority
from the state legislature to an independent commission in the
name of popular sovereignty is constitutionally permissible, subject
only to congressional approval. Davis v. Hildebrant, for example,
involved a constitutional challenge to Ohio’s process for enacting its
congressional redistricting plan.186 Instead of obtaining the gover-
nor’s approval for the plan as required by state law, a majority of
Ohioans used the referendum process enshrined in the Ohio Con-
stitution to vote down the redistricting plan.187 The Court held that,
not only did Congress endorse the referendum process in the 1911
Act as part of the legislative power of the state, the issue of whether
this structure violated the Elections Clause created a nonjusticiable
political question.188 The Court’s deferential posture suggests that
185. Id. at 2688-89 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Michael T. Morley, The New
Elections Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 79, 81 (2016) (arguing that the Arizona IRC
decision impermissibly allows states to “completely and permanently exclude their institu-
tional legislatures from regulating congressional—and, by extension, presidential—elections,
subject to no apparent limiting principle”). Professor Morley recognizes that states have “no
inherent power to regulate federal elections” and he focuses on a number of ways in which the
text and case law limits their authority. Morley, supra, at 103-04. But he ignores that Con-
gress itself is also a limiting principle on state authority and can weigh in at will, even with
respect to the state institutions responsible for administering the regulations that govern
federal elections, because that is the nature of sovereign authority.
186. See 241 U.S. 565, 566-67 (1916).
187. See id.
188. See id. at 568 (“[W]e think it clear that Congress in 1911 in enacting the controlling
law concerning the duties of the States through their legislative authority, to deal with the
subject of the creation of congressional districts expressly modified the phraseology of the
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Congress has sole authority to determine whether states have ex-
ercised their authority under the Elections Clause in a manner that
is consistent with the Guarantee Clause.189 Indeed, a different out-
come in Davis—that the state legislature must enact regulations
governing federal elections even if the state’s constitutionally
prescribed lawmaking function lies with some other entity—would
present a nonfrivolous issue under the Tenth Amendment, an
unintended paradox for a Clause that is specifically focused on
congressional sovereignty.190
Most important, the term “legislature” defies fixed meaning in the
context of the Elections Clause because the functions of the
respective legislatures and their compositions vary by state.191 In
Smiley v. Holm, for example, the plaintiff contested the validity of
Minnesota’s congressional redistricting plan after the Secretary of
State implemented the plan without the governor’s approval.192 The
Court rejected the redistricting plan because it had not been
adopted in accordance with state law, and the Clause explicitly
previous acts relating to that subject by inserting a clause plainly intended to provide that
where by the state constitution and laws the referendum was treated as part of the legislative
power, the power as thus constituted should be held and treated to be the state legislative
power for the purpose of creating congressional districts by law.”).
189. Id. at 569 (“To the extent that the contention urges ... to include the referendum
within state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment is repugnant to § 4 of Article
I of the Constitution, and hence void ... we again think the contention is plainly without
substance [because it] must rest upon the assumption that to include the referendum in the
scope of the legislative power is to introduce a virus which ... in effect annihilates repre-
sentative government [in violation of the Guarantee Clause and] ... presents no justiciable
controversy.”). The Court appeared to retreat from this position a few years later. In Hawke
v. Smith, the Court referred to “legislature” as a term that is fixed throughout the Consti-
tution, defined as “the representative body which made the laws of the people.” 253 U.S. 221,
227 (1920). As such, Ohio could not subject the state legislature’s ratification of the Eigh-
teenth Amendment to a referendum by the voters, which was not required by Article V of the
Federal Constitution. Id. at 225, 231. But Hawke can be easily distinguished on the grounds
that it did not involve federal elections, and later Elections Clause cases are inconsistent with
its holding. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
190. The Tenth Amendment issue would arise because forcing all election regulations
through the state legislature would intrude on the state’s sovereign authority to structure its
government in the manner that it sees fit, and by implication determine which entity has
lawmaking authority. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367-68 (1932) (“[There is] no
suggestion in [Article I, Section 4] of an attempt to endow the legislature of the State with
power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State has
provided that laws shall be enacted.”).
191. See id. at 372-73.
192. See id. at 361-62.
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confers on the state the authority to prescribe, by law, the times,
places, and manner of federal elections.193
Because of the diversity among state governmental structures, it
is unsurprising that the Smiley Court held that the term “prescribed
... by the Legislature thereof ” requires that the apportionment plan
be adopted by the lawmaking procedure set out in the state consti-
tution,194 which is also the document that determines the varying
composition and character of all fifty state legislatures. For this
reason, and contrary to the assertions of the Arizona IRC dissenters,
“legislature” cannot be a fixed term. Query what would be the out-
come under their theory if Arizona had defined its legislature in the
state constitution to encompass the independent commission re-
sponsible for drawing state legislative districts? While it is unclear,
one could argue that forbidding this structure ex ante undermines
state sovereignty significantly more than endorsing a flexible defi-
nition of the term “legislature” subject only to implicit or explicit
congressional approval.
The flexibility of the term “legislature” shows that the Elections
Clause is broad enough to encompass any accommodations for pop-
ular sovereignty that a state chooses to incorporate in its lawmaking
procedures. Such considerations are legitimate, provided that Con-
gress, in its sovereign capacity to “make or alter” state law, prior-
itizes this value, as it had in both section 2a(c) and the 1911 Act.
193. See id. at 367-68.
194. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. While the end result is the correct one, the Court in
Smiley argued that the term legislature is fixed, but its functions vary. See Smiley, 285 U.S.
at 365-66 (noting that the legislature may act as a “ratifying body,” a “consenting body,” a
“representative body,” or an “electoral body”). This approach denies the dynamicism that is
inherent in our constitutional structure that makes it difficult for “legislature” to have
uniform meaning. For example, Nebraska has a unicameral legislature and all other states
have bicameral legislatures. See History of the Nebraska Unicameral, NEB. LEGISLATURE,
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/about/history_unicameral.php [https://perma.cc/3SN7-ZR34].
So long as the state legislature comports with minimum constitutional requirements, a state
has a lot of leeway in determining the structure of its representative body. See, e.g., Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (requiring that state representatives be elected from
districts of as “equal population as is practicable”).
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B. Elections Clause Value: Preserving the Legitimacy of Federal
Elections Through Predictable and Competent Election
Administration
Elections Clause values also derive more generally from the Su-
preme Court’s case law, which has consistently prioritized election
integrity, or the idea that federal elections must be administered in
a manner that does not call the outcome into question.195 The ju-
diciary’s de facto deference to state law does not derive from any
special solicitude for the states as states; rather, it is about ensuring
that elections are well run in order to produce a legitimate out-
come.196 Toward this end, courts have developed a separate doc-
trine—the Purcell principle—named for a short, per curiam, 2006
Supreme Court decision that sets the standards for injunctions in
election law cases that emerge close to the time of the election.197
The Purcell principle privileges the status quo by blocking changes
that would alter rules on the eve of the election due to administra-
tive concerns and the increased risk of disenfranchisement should
voting changes occur shortly before the election.198
Purcell recognized the risk of instability and uncertainty in the
election law context. Along the same lines, an open struggle for
power between the states and the federal government, which can
help define and promote the values of federalism in other substan-
tive contexts, can undermine the legitimacy of our system of elec-
tions. The perception that the election system was broken had dam-
aged our political system in the wake of Bush v. Gore, after voters
endured thirty-seven days of political high theater in which the
Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
195. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2008) (plurality
opinion); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
196. Notably, the need for finality and easy administration of state election laws is the
primary reason why the right to vote is not treated like other rights, at least according to the
Court’s case law. See Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter
Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 168-72 (2015).
197. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-6 (2006) (per curiam) (“Court orders affecting
elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and conse-
quent incentive to remain away from the polls.”).
198. See id. at 5-6; see also Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 427, 428-29 (2016) (arguing that the Purcell principle should give way if there is
a “risk of issuing orders [that] can disenfranchise voters or impose significant burdens on
election administrators for no good reason”).
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battled over whether the recount comported with constitutional
requirements.199 Ultimately, George W. Bush squeaked out a victory
in Florida after the United States Supreme Court ended the
recount, effectively handing him the presidency.200 Controversy over
the 2000 election dogged Bush for his entire first term, which for
years was haunted by accusations that he was not duly elected
despite his 546-vote margin over Al Gore in Florida.201 
Bush v. Gore notwithstanding, the Court generally has deferred
to the states by privileging their interest in ensuring the integrity
of their elections over a citizen’s interest in exercising his or her
constitutional rights. Notably, many states have enacted “election
integrity” regulations under the guise of complying with federal law.
For example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the
Court upheld Indiana’s voter identification law as an effort to effec-
tuate the goals of HAVA and NVRA, both of which impose various
requirements on the states that, among other things, modernize
election procedures, insure the accuracy of the voter rolls, and
impose a more uniform system of voter registration.202 As the Court
stated in Crawford, “Of course, neither HAVA nor NVRA required
Indiana to enact SEA 483, but they do indicate that Congress
believes that photo identification is one effective method of estab-
lishing a voter’s qualification to vote and that the integrity of
elections is enhanced through improved technology.”203
In some ways, Crawford resembles Arizona IRC—federal law
permitted but did not require Indiana to adopt a voter identification
law,204 just as Arizona did not have to delegate its redistricting
authority to an independent commission in order to comport with
199. See Rick Hampson, 2000 v. 2016: Why Gore Then Is Different Than Trump Now, USA
TODAY (Oct. 21, 2016, 11:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/
10/20/donald-trump-al-gore-2000-election-outcome/92477932/ [https://perma.cc/L2DJ-TB6B].
200. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
201. See Hampson, supra note 199 (discussing the criticisms of the Bush presidency in the
wake of Bush v. Gore).
202. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(vindicating the state’s “interest in participating in a nationwide effort to improve and
modernize election procedures that have been criticized as antiquated and inefficient ... in
preventing voter fraud ... [and] in safeguarding voter confidence”); supra note 44; see also Lee
v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 607-08 (4th Cir. 2016).
203. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 193.
204. See id.
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section 2a.205 In both cases, the Court pointed to federal law as an
alternative justification for the state regulation, and the justifica-
tions were explicitly tied to the key Elections Clause values of elim-
inating administrative concerns and ensuring the legitimacy of the
outcome in federal elections.206 But Crawford is especially prob-
lematic, with the court vindicating the state’s interest in election
integrity over the individual’s right to vote without requiring any
evidence that the regulation actually furthered Indiana’s regulatory
goals.207 While one might take issue with the Court’s approach for
this and other reasons,208 it is nonetheless clear from Crawford that
the states’ interest in election integrity is a cornerstone of our pol-
itical system, and it has been validated, in the Court’s view, by fed-
eral legislation enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause.
Doe v. Reed further confirmed that the states’ interest in election
integrity is substantial, holding that states can disclose the names
of those who sign a petition to challenge a state law by referen-
dum.209 Although there were First Amendment concerns in compel-
ling the disclosure of the signatories through a public records
request, the Court stated that the electoral context must be taken
into account in determining whether such disclosure raises constitu-
tional concerns.210 The Court determined that, on balance, Washing-
ton’s interest in preserving the integrity of its electoral process
trumped its citizens’ First Amendment rights:
[T]he State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral
process suffices to defeat the argument that [disclosure] is
unconstitutional with respect to referendum petitions in general
.... [That] interest is particularly strong with respect to efforts to
root out fraud .... But the State’s interest ... is not limited to
205. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
207. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 192-93.
208. And I have. See Tolson, supra note 196, at 161-65.
209. See 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010).
210. Id. at 194-95 (“The compelled disclosure of signatory information on referendum
petitions is subject to review under the First Amendment. An individual expresses a view on
a political matter when he signs a petition under Washington’s referendum procedure. In
most cases, the individual’s signature will express the view that the law subject to the petition
should be overturned. Even if the signer is agnostic as to the merits of the underlying law, his
signature still expresses the political view that the question should be considered ‘by the
whole electorate.’” (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988))).
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combating fraud[; it] extends to efforts to ferret out invalid
signatures caused not by fraud but by simple mistake, such as
duplicate signatures or signatures of individuals who are not
registered to vote in the State. [The State’s] interest also extends
more generally to promoting transparency and accountability in
the electoral process.211
Though Doe did not involve federal law, the Court cited to Purcell
and Crawford to illustrate the overriding importance of protecting
the legitimacy of our political system, even when there are counter-
vailing First Amendment interests (or in the cases of Crawford and
Purcell, Fourteenth Amendment interests) on the other side.212
The regulatory actions that states can take in the name of elec-
tion integrity are extremely broad, so the Court’s view that Con-
gress has endorsed this interest in federal legislation is extremely
important. In addition to Crawford’s description of “election integ-
rity” to include the state’s adoption of a voter identification law as
a means of modernizing its administrative procedures,213 the Court
has also upheld various state statutes in the name of election integ-
rity. For example, the Court has allowed states to place boundary
restrictions on the distribution of campaign finance materials;214
impose waiting periods on voters who wanted to change their party
registration;215 bar judicial candidates from personally soliciting
campaign funds;216 and exclude write-in candidates from the bal-
lot.217 It is clear that the rubric of “election integrity” is not only
about an honest process, but also about easing the administrative
burdens on state officials. Once one understands that certainty of
outcome and ease of administration hold a vaunted position in the
211. Id. at 197-98 (citations omitted).
212. Id. at 197.
213. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191, 200 (2008) (plurality opin-
ion).
214. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion).
215. Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 793-94 (1974); see also Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1986).
216. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).
217. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).
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electoral context,218 it is easier to dismiss some of the more promi-
nent theories of federalism that promote organizational structures
between the states and the federal government that could poten-
tially undermine the electoral legitimacy that these values are de-
signed to safeguard.219
In my prior work, I rejected the argument that polyphonic
federalism, which “asks how the overlapping power of the state and
federal governments can best address a particular issue,”220 works
as a governing framework for the Elections Clause because the flu-
idity of the doctrine is not amenable to a system that requires clear
winners and losers.221 I have also probed the utility of cooperative
federalism as an underlying theory for the Elections Clause,222 a
218. Note that emphasizing the values of integrity and efficiency is qualitatively different
from deferring to state sovereignty, even though states often rely on the latter in justifying
their interest in electoral integrity and efficiency. The states and the federal government may
have differing opinions about how the goals of integrity and efficiency are best furthered. See,
e.g., Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2251, 2260 (2013) (finding that Arizona’s
documentary proof of citizenship requirement is preempted by the NVRA, which only requires
voters to affirm their citizenship status).
219. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 119 (2010) (arguing that Congress can
“tax, spend, and regulate” under Article I, Section 8 “when two or more states face collective
action problems” that derive from “interstate externalities and national markets ... that affect
the general welfare”). This theory’s focus on using federalism to provide a solution for collec-
tive action problems as a justification for federal action could apply to the Elections Clause.
Congress often imposes uniformity on the states to address a problem that requires a one-size-
fits-all solution, see, e.g., Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C.
§§ 20301-20311 (Supp. III 2016), but this theory does not capture the unique dynamic of the
Clause in which Congress can act for any reason at all—no collective action problem required. 
220. Tolson, supra note 6, at 1214 (quoting Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 285 (2005)).
221. See, e.g., id. at 1214-15 (rejecting the theory of polyphonic federalism because
“encouraging the dialogue that polyphonic federalism envisions between state and federal
governments results in an absence of finality and an increase in forum shopping that could
undermine the legitimacy of our electoral system” (citing Schapiro, supra note 220, at 291)).
Polyphonic federalism would arguably support a view of Congress’s Elections Clause authority
that places voter qualification standards firmly within the scope of federal authority. See
ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS 95 (2009) (“In the polyphonic conception, federalism is characterized by the existence
of multiple, independent sources of political authority. The scope of this political authority is
not defined by subject matter. No kind of conduct is categorically beyond the boundaries of
state or federal jurisdiction.”). This Article resists a reading of federal power that would
essentially negate the constitutional structure, arguing instead that Congress can reach voter
qualifications pursuant to Elections Clause only in certain circumstances. See Tolson, supra
note 39.
222. Tolson, supra note 6, at 1216 (noting that the Clause “provides that states will draw
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contention that, at least initially, seemed more plausible than poly-
phonic or process-based theories of federalism.223 But I ultimately
concluded that the presence of the congressional veto in the text of
the Elections Clause and the substantive mandates imposed on the
states are in direct conflict with the very idea of “cooperative” fed-
eralism.224
Recent work by Professor Abbe Gluck has added significantly
more nuance to the concept of “cooperative federalism,” nuance
that—at least initially—may offer stronger support than prior
iterations for cooperative federalism as a theoretical description of
our system of elections.225 Professor Gluck envisions a system in
which states preserve some aspects of their sovereign authority
through inter-governmental cooperation, in which states strengthen
their position relative to the federal government through altering,
shaping, and implementing federal law.226 States exercise this power
the lines in the first instance but gives Congress the ability to change or alter such plans,
suggesting a coordination that is akin to many modern federal regulatory programs”).
223. While the states’ role in setting the times, places, and manner of federal elections is
an important “political safeguard of federalism” that gives states significant autonomy in this
sphere, see Tolson, supra note 99, at 861-62, Congress’s ability to negate state law at will in
furtherance of values that have little to do with protecting the policy-making authority of the
states limits this theory’s explanatory power as a framework for the Clause, see Heather K.
Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1554 (2012) (noting that process
federalists “argue that federalism depends on preserving the de facto autonomy of the states,
not the de jure autonomy afforded by sovereignty”). Some process theorists have also relied
on courts to police federal power as a supplement to the political safeguards. See, e.g., Ernest
A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1358-59 (2001). However,
I reject the argument that the federalism-based doctrines that the Court has developed to
protect state power, such as the equal sovereignty or clear statement rules, apply to legis-
lation enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying
text.
224. See Tolson, supra note 6, at 1216 (“[M]ost cooperative federalism programs entail
voluntary state involvement[, but] [t]he VRA and other federal legislation that alters or
changes state electoral practices are anything but voluntary and tend to trigger substantial
outrage on the part of the states.”); see also Corwin, supra note 133, at 21 (discussing
cooperative federalism in the context of social security and noting, “[t]he other great objection
to Cooperative Federalism is more difficult to meet, if indeed it can be met. This is, that
‘Cooperative Federalism’ spells further aggrandizement of national power. Unquestionably
it does, for when two cooperate it is the stronger member of the combination who calls the
tunes.”). 
225. See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998-99 (2014).
226. See id. at 1997 (“With almost every national statutory step, Congress gives states new
governing opportunities or incorporates aspects of state law—displacing state authority with
one hand and giving it back with the other. Federalists should pay attention: ... this role for
the states within the federal legislation is a primary vehicle through which states have
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at the pleasure of Congress, but still play a substantial role in coor-
dinating the structure and scope of federal regulatory programs.227
The political system is similar in this respect because Congress
routinely relies on state-level implementation and state law in
regulating federal elections.228 Prior to Shelby County, section 5 of
the VRA allowed states to negotiate with the federal government
over changes that the state wanted to make to its election laws.229
Both the HAVA and the NVRA are prime examples of federal stat-
utes that rely on state implementation and cooperation.230 Congress
could arguably administer the programs itself, but instead has used
its “make or alter” authority to delegate this responsibility, evoking
Professor Gluck’s powerful imagery of intergovernmental coopera-
tion that is at the heart of cooperative federalism.
Nonetheless, conceptual problems arise when describing the
interaction between the states and the federal government over
elections as “cooperative federalism.” Federal election statutes, even
those that rely on state law for substantive content, are very re-
strictive of state power in a way that is unimaginable for a statute
emerging from the federalism inspired process that Professor Gluck
outlines.231 The VRA’s preclearance regime, for example, is not a
system in which any state concerned about its sovereign authority
would want to participate.232
Similarly, the NVRA looks far different than the structure created
by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which Professor Gluck points to
as a paradigmatic example of federalism in the age of statutes.233
The NVRA’s requirements are driven, not by deference to state law,
but by a need for certainty and legitimacy of the outcome with re-
influence on major questions of policy, and through which state sovereign powers retain their
relevance, albeit in ways different from those contemplated by the traditional account.”).
227. See id. at 1998-99.
228. See supra Part II.
229. See Michael J. Pitts, Rescuing Retrogression, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 741, 743-44 (2016).
230. See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 34, at 749-52.
231. See Gluck, supra note 225, at 1997, 1999.
232. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); see also Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618, 2624 (2013) (criticizing the VRA for requiring states
to seek approval to enact laws that are otherwise constitutional).
233. In the context of the ACA, states have final policy-making authority over some aspect
of the healthcare statute, but Congress delegates this authority to them. See Abbe R. Gluck,
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law
in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 539-41 (2011).
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spect to voter registration, factors that do not apply to the same ex-
tent in the context of the ACA and other federal statutory regimes
that have structures premised on flexibility.234 The NVRA establish-
es criteria with which states must adhere in conducting voter reg-
istration for federal elections and prohibits certain regulations that
would needlessly disenfranchise individuals. The statute clarifies
when states can conduct voter registration;235 how voters can be re-
moved from the voter rolls;236 and the process by which states must
allow voters to register.237 These regulations impose costs and mini-
mize the flexibility that states would otherwise have in structuring
this aspect of their electoral system.238 Arguably, recent attempts by
states to alter the federal voter registration form highlight the prob-
lem with flexibility in this context; it can lead to voter confusion and
disenfranchisement that ultimately undermines the statute’s pur-
poses.239 Comparatively, the ACA, which permits states to decide
whether to set up health care exchanges, has managed to survive
despite the fact that its reach has been undermined by the flexibility
234. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 137, at 2181 (“[S]tability in sustaining a sufficiently
principled law of federalism-based limits on national power can be better achieved with more
flexible (rather than categorical) standards, given the dynamic and pragmatic character of
successful federalism.”).
235. Section 6 requires each state to designate as voter registration agencies all offices in
the state that provide public assistance and administer state-funded programs primarily
engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities. 52 U.S.C. § 20506 (Supp. III 2016).
236. Each state must also provide that a registrant may not be removed from the official
list of eligible voters except by registrant request, by reason of criminal conviction or mental
incapacity, or by a general program that removes voters ineligible due to death or a change
in residence. Id. § 20507(a)(3)-(4). States must complete any program to systematically remove
ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters no later than ninety days prior to the
date of a federal election. Id. § 20507(c)(2)(A).
237. Under section 5, a voter registration application form must be part of each state’s
motor vehicle registration. Id. § 20504(a)(1). Section 6 requires each state to accept and use
the voter registration application form prescribed by the Federal Election Commission to
register voters by mail. Id. § 20505(a).
238. See, e.g., Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the federal government does not have to cover the costs of state implementation of the
NVRA).
239. See Robin Shulman, Avoiding Contempt of Court, Kansas Secretary of State Kris
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of its mandates—flexibility that could be fatal to the legitimacy and
administration of federal elections.240
If Professor Gluck’s theory fails to capture the finality and admin-
istrative ease at the heart of the Elections Clause, then Professor
Heather Gerken’s theory of federalism as nationalism presents this
problem to an even greater degree. Professor Gerken argues that
the true value of federalism is in achieving a well-functioning na-
tional democracy and, as such, her theory is significantly less con-
cerned with state sovereignty than other approaches.241 With this
theory’s focus on federal preemption of state law, the states can be-
come irrelevant if their governing prerogatives do not further dem-
ocratic end goals.242
Contrary to nationalism, the Elections Clause assumes that well-
functioning states will exercise significant authority in order to
preserve their role in the formation of the federal government,243
and are not there simply to “tee up the conflicts and debates that
forge national norms.”244 Toward this end, Congress has routinely
240. See Gluck, supra note 233, at 539-41.
241. Gerken, supra note 223, at 1556-57 (arguing that a well-functioning national democra-
cy can be achieved by placing policy-making authority with the federal government, but it
does not preclude the devolution of decisions down to the state level if doing so would achieve
this goal).
242. Cf. Gluck, supra note 225, at 2000 (“[T]o be clear, National Federalism is not a
federalism shorn of state sovereignty. It is true that National Federalism emerges through
congressional displacement of state law with a new, overarching federal statutory scheme.
But this federalism depends on, and strengthens, the states’ continuing sovereign status in
important ways that have yet to be recognized.”).
243. See Tolson, supra note 6, at 1207, 1258 (arguing that this is one of the purposes behind
the Clause’s adoption).
244. See Heather K. Gerken, Sovereignty Is the Wrong Path for Federalism: A Response to
Ilya Somin, BALKINAZATION (Jan. 3, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/01/sovereignty-is-
wrong-path-for.html [https://perma.cc/UVE7-DPZ7] (emphasis omitted) (arguing that states
do not need to be sovereign to play this important role). This debate further corroborates the
problems with the federalism framework, and in particular, its laser focus on state
sovereignty but oversight of congressional sovereignty. Sovereignty remains an important
concept as applied to the Elections Clause because it can resolve disputes between the states
and the federal government over the regulation of federal elections. But both the nationalists
and the more traditional federalists continue to deploy notions of state sovereignty—or in this
case the absence of sovereignty—in ways that are consistent with federalism doctrine but
inconsistent with the Elections Clause. Compare Rick Hills, A Response to Heather Gerken:
Why the Politics of Tolerent Pluralism Need the Legal Institutions of Federalism,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 3, 2017, 4:15 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/01/a-
response-to-heather-gerken-why-the-politics-of-tolerant-pluralism-need-the-legal-institutions-
of-f.html [https://perma.cc/ M8HP-D8QS], with Heather K. Gerken, Do the Rules of the Game
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declined to intercede in the management of federal elections, even
when states have passed laws that are decidedly antidemocratic.245
And the few times when Congress has intervened in the electoral
process were not only to protect our national democracy, but also to
further important process goals designed to keep the states inex-
tricably intertwined in the business of federal elections.
Congress’s enactment of HAVA as a response to several issues
that occurred during the 2000 presidential election is instructive of
this point.246 The statistical tie in Florida, where approximately one
hundred million ballots were cast, created significant doubt about
the voting process in several counties in Florida, leading to litiga-
tion and public protest.247 Congress had major concerns about the
use of varying technologies throughout the state, the questionable
experience of poll-workers, and the fact that local governments bore
the costs of elections and voter registration—all of which played a
role in the controversy surrounding the 2000 election.248 Given this,
Congress could have easily justified imposing a uniform rule that
addressed these issues, but HAVA does not nationalize presidential
elections. Instead, it addresses these administrative problems by
moving the election process “from an environment of local control
with loose state and federal oversight to an environment of strong
state control and loose federal oversight.”249 Congress assumed that
most states were well-functioning such that they could continue to
manage presidential elections; for those with problems, the answer
was not federal uniformity, but more oversight of local election
boards by state officials.
Through HAVA, Congress adhered to its traditional position of
leaving much of the preexisting state regime in place to promote fi-
nality and ease of administration, even when it was incentivized, as
with the 2000 election controversy, to remove all aspects of federal
Matter When You Are Playing in a Hurricane?, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 8, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://
balkin.blogspot.com/2017/01/do-rules-of-game-matter-when-you-are.html [https://perma.cc/
23Q5-CB4L].
245. See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
246. See Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J.
424, 426-28 (2004).
247. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that the recount of
presidential ballots without uniform standards violated equal protection).
248. See Shambon, supra note 246, at 424-25.
249. Id. at 431.
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election regulation from the states entirely. Congress’s decision not
to nationalize federal elections in the wake of the 2000 election
illustrates that these values matter at least as much as—and prob-
ably more than—creating a well-functioning national democracy in
which uniform federal authority might better address dysfunction
in a swing state, but could potentially cause chaos in the forty or so
other states that properly conduct their elections. The baseline as-
sumption in the Clause is that states should be sufficiently autono-
mous to properly structure federal elections, but in those instances
in which federal oversight could result in more democratic out-
comes, Congress has proven to be remarkably stubborn in enacting
uniform and far reaching legislation.250 This complex dynamic can-
not be captured by a theory that marginalizes the role of the states
in national politics, particularly when their continued political
health must be a vital part of any theory that seeks to explain the
unique structure of the Elections Clause. For purposes of legitimacy
and ease of administration, states remain relevant and important
for the regulation of federal elections—just not sovereign over them.
C. Elections Clause Value: Preserving the Legitimacy of Federal
Elections Through Congressional Sovereignty
Recently, scholars have built on Professor Gerken’s nationalism
approach by explicitly applying this sovereignty-free theory of fed-
eralism—congressional, state, or otherwise—to explain intergovern-
mental relationships in the context of federal elections. For exam-
ple, Professor Justin Weinstein-Tull describes the Elections Clause
as embodying “election clause federalism” because federal election
statutes enacted pursuant to the Clause impose liability on states
for any violations, even though most states have delegated responsi-
bility for election administration to local governments.251 As a result,
states often attempt to evade liability under these statutes by
pointing to local governments as the wrongdoers, placing the federal
government in the uncomfortable position of trying to force the
250. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276-77 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting the
numerous times that Congress has proposed, but not passed, legislation to govern redis-
tricting).
251. See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 34, at 764.
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states to enforce federal election law against their subdivisions.252
Professor Weinstein-Tull describes these relationships as “hyperfed-
eralized[,] not only because states push election decisions down to
the local level, but because the quality of decentralization, including
legal relationships between counties and states, varies by state.”253
While Professor Weinstein-Tull’s insight about the complexities
of these relationships is important, he uses the federalism label in
a manner that ignores the historical and legal baggage associated
with the term, while downplaying the importance of congressional
sovereignty in resolving the hard questions that arise over election
regulation.254 Indeed, Congress’s ability to act in complete disregard
of state sovereignty not only undermines the federalism narrative,
but it also explains why statutes like the HAVA and NVRA can, as
Professor Weinstein-Tull argues, “require states to organize their
subdivisions to either effectively oversee certain kinds of election
administration or administer elections themselves[,] ... even though
organizing and delegating power to political subdivisions has long
been understood as the very essence of state sovereignty.”255
Shoving the Clause’s organizational structure into an ill-fitting
federalism framework that does little to explain the sui generis na-
ture of congressional power does not provide clarity or resolve issues
arising across a broad range of cases in determining which entity
should dictate policy in this area. The Clause’s focus on congressio-
nal sovereignty helps resolve these legal and political disputes.256
252. See id. at 767-75; see also Gerken, supra note 223, at 1556-60.
253. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 34, at 753.
254. See id. at 753 n.33 (“Courts and scholars have discussed federalism and voting rights
before—particularly in the context of the ‘federalism costs’ of the Voting Rights Act. Here, I
mean something different: not the costs to state sovereignty of the federal election statutes,
but rather the set of federal-state-local relationships implicated by the statutes and the
balance of power—both formal and functional—inherent in those relationships.” (citation
omitted)). It is not entirely clear if Professor Weinstein-Tull models his Elections Clause
theory after a cooperative federalism model, or if he thinks that this is federalism just because
it involves governance by more than one sovereign. See id. (suggesting that it is the latter).
But see id. at 753 n.32 (“The term ‘election law federalism’ follows a number of other studies
about federalism as it relates to specific policy areas.”). If Professor Weinstein-Tull embraces
nationalism as his governing theory, nationalists view federalism as one of many tools that
can further the theory’s focus on creating a national democracy, but do not see it as a theory
of federalism in and of itself. See Gerken, supra note 223.
255. See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 34, at 751-52.
256. See Issacharoff, supra note 47, at 108 (arguing that “the level of constitutional scrutiny
should drop when Congress exercises powers directly granted by the Constitution rather than
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However, the level of deference accorded to state law in this context
often turns on the Court’s view that states retain sovereignty under
the Elections Clause in amounts similar to the Reconstruction
Amendments.257
Consistent with this view, the Arizona cases reaffirm that federal
authority is paramount in the context of federal elections. But these
cases impermissibly view the federal government’s primary role to
be a vehicle to protect state sovereignty over elections instead of
furthering the Clause’s primary goal of ensuring the legitimacy of
federal elections. As Justice Alito argued in his dissent in Arizona
Inter Tribal:
[T]he Elections Clause’s default rule [that states retain their
authority unless Congress indicates otherwise] helps to protect
the States’ authority to regulate state and local elections. As a
practical matter, it would be very burdensome for a State to
maintain separate federal and state registration processes with
separate federal and state voter rolls. For that reason, any
federal regulation in this area is likely to displace not only state
control of federal elections but also state control of state and
local elections.258
Because congressional interference can undermine a state’s au-
thority over its own elections, Justice Alito (and Justice Thomas
who dissented as well)259 argued that the Court must defer to state
authority to regulate federal elections.260 But the Clause does not
powers inherited pursuant to the enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause”).
257. See supra Part II; see also Morley, supra note 185, at 99 (arguing that the Elections
Clause is a “grant[ ] of constitutional authority to state legislatures ... [and] this specific
delegation of authority imposes a special duty on other governmental entities to ensure that
they apply election laws as written by the legislature, rather than with the flexibility and
discretion they otherwise might be permitted to apply”).
258. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2272 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
259. See, e.g., id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260. See also Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
the argument that the use of state offices and state officials to implement the NVRA violated
the Tenth Amendment). Notably, Wilson does not prioritize state sovereignty over federal
power, rightly confining its analysis to whether the NVRA could impair the state’s authority
over its own elections in violation of the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 1413. The court con-
cluded that this is the only federalism that matters—not the relationship between the states
and the federal government over federal elections, but the relationship between the states and
the federal government over state and local elections. See id. at 1415. Although declining to
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require Congress to circumscribe its own power to protect state
authority in this way.
Nonetheless, the Court’s framing in Arizona Inter Tribal of con-
gressional power under the Clause as “none other than the power to
pre-empt” could be interpreted in two possible ways that are con-
sistent with the dissenters’ protectionist stance toward state sover-
eignty.261 Because Congress shares concurrent authority over the
times, places, and manner of federal elections with the states, one
reading of Arizona Inter Tribal is that federal power, when exer-
cised, by definition displaces some aspect of state authority, even if
the state has not acted.262 The Court approaches its dormant Com-
merce Clause cases in this manner, and could be applying similar
reasoning to the Elections Clause.263 Alternatively, the Court’s
language framing federal power in terms of preemption alone could
mean that Congress has to displace some element of state law to act
pursuant to the Clause and cannot legislate independently.264 This
read the NVRA in a manner that would impair California’s power to conduct its state
elections, the Ninth Circuit rightly recognized that, with respect to federal elections, states
cannot use the power reserved to them under the Tenth Amendment to subvert Congress’s
authority under the Elections Clause. See id. at 1415-16.
261. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013).
262. One could argue that, similar to cases involving field preemption, Congress has the
authority to preempt laws that states have enacted as well as those laws that could be, but
were not enacted. This framework would leave Congress with the authority to independently
make law. But to frame the Clause’s structure in terms of field preemption principles ignores
the substantial authority that the Clause delegates to states over the times, places, and
manner of federal elections and the Clause’s broader purpose that the states would continue
to exercise this power, if not abused. Given Arizona Inter Tribal’s concession that federal
power under the Clause could interfere with state control over voter qualifications, arguably
one is justified in taking seriously the possibility that the Court intended to impose a state
action requirement on exercises of federal power under the Elections Clause.
263. Cf. Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571 (1997)
(holding that “the Commerce Clause had not only granted Congress express authority to
override restrictive and conflicting commercial regulations adopted by the States, but that it
also had immediately effected a curtailment of state power. ‘In short, the Commerce Clause
even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the
States.’” (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945))). But see Arizona
Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2257 n.6 (distinguishing the exercise of federal power under the
Elections Clause from the Commerce Clause because “laws enacted under the Commerce
Clause (arguably the other enumerated power whose exercise is most likely to trench on state
regulatory authority) will not always implicate concurrent state power—a prohibition on the
interstate transport of a commodity, for example”).
264. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2257 & n.6 (“When Congress legislates with respect
to the ‘Times, Places and Manner’ of holding congressional elections, it necessarily displaces
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is the equivalent of a state action requirement, similar to that which
exists under the Reconstruction Amendments.265 This requirement
would preserve “state control of state and local elections”266 but
hamper Congress’s ability to regulate federal elections.
Both of these interpretations are problematic for a number of
reasons. If the Court, under the dormant Commerce Clause ap-
proach, seeks to limit Congress to the subject matter of the Clause—
times, places, and manner—by tying it to state power over the same
topic, this approach ignores the elusive boundary between manner
regulations and voter qualification standards. As Justice Thomas
argued in dissent, it is impossible to disentangle Arizona’s proof of
citizenship requirement (arguably a voter qualification standard)
from the regime of voter registration (long held to be a manner reg-
ulation), posing problems for the power that the states retain, under
Article I, Section 2, to set voter qualifications for federal elections.267
The answer, however, is less about finding ways to vindicate or
protect state authority, and more about conceding the sovereignty
that Congress has under the Clause, which may, in some limited in-
stances, permissibly interfere with state control over voter qual-
ifications.268
The state action interpretation of the Elections Clause raises even
more red flags than the dormant Commerce Clause approach. By
interpreting every exercise of congressional authority as a preemp-
tion of state law, the Court read the terms “make” and “alter” in the
Clause as synonyms, which is contrary to its prior case law. In
McConnell v. FEC, for example, the Court upheld Title I of the Bi-
partisan Campaign Regulation Act against a claim that Congress
exceeded its authority under the Elections Clause in barring the use
of soft money to fund federal elections.269 While the Court acknowl-
edged that Title I would “prohibit[ ] some fundraising tactics that
would otherwise be permitted under the laws of various States,” the
Court framed these effects as “indirect” because Title I “does not
some element of a pre-existing legal regime erected by the States” because “the text of the
Clause confers the power to do exactly (and only) that”).
265. Cf. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12
(1883).
266. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2272.
267. Id. at 2265-68 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
268. See Tolson, supra note 39.
269. 540 U.S. 93, 184 (2003). 
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expressly pre-empt state legislation, ... leav[ing] the States free to
enforce their own restrictions on the financing of state electoral
campaigns.”270
In contrast, Arizona Inter Tribal could be interpreted as making
state legislation a prerequisite for federal action because of the
Court’s unerring loyalty to the dual federalism regime. Federalism,
and its focus on the governing prerogatives of the states, is at odds
with the two key features of congressional sovereignty in the Elec-
tions Clause: (1) Congress’s power to legislate in complete disregard
of state law; and (2) Congress’s authority to commandeer state of-
ficials to enforce federal election law.271 As we see in the Arizona
cases, concerns about state power make it easy to confuse the state’s
autonomy in this area with authentic sovereign authority, but these
factors confirm that the Clause’s focus is federal power.
1. Federalism “Lite”: State Sovereignty and Congress’s
Independent Authority to Legislate
The Supreme Court’s statements about the supremacy of federal
law under the Elections Clause, while true, lull the reader into
thinking that state sovereignty has taken a backseat to congres-
sional power. But the Court’s implicit deference to state law in the
Arizona Inter Tribal opinion suggests that this narrative is mislead-
ing. By declining to apply the presumption against preemption, the
Court made an institutional choice that it, and not Congress, is best
equipped to determine the extent to which state law is preempted.
Recent preemption controversies have been primarily matters of
institutional choice, or put differently, questions over which insti-
tution should determine if a federal statute preempts state law.272
The presumption against preemption places this responsibility
squarely on the shoulders of Congress, by requiring Congress to be
express in its preemption of state law, lest the Court decide other-
wise by assuming the presumptive validity of state law.273 Declining
to apply the presumption aggrandizes the Court at the expense of
270. Id. at 186.
271. See Tolson, supra note 6, at 1216.
272. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992).
273. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727,
728 (2008).
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Congress, and unfortunately, the Court has perceived its role in this
area to be protector of the states.274
The refusal to apply the presumption is defensible only if the
Court truly believes, as it claims in Arizona Inter Tribal, that fed-
eralism interests are weaker in the context of federal elections.275
Congress is arguably sovereign in that sphere, and the Court’s doc-
trine must always reflect this primacy. On initial review, the Ari-
zona Inter Tribal Court’s refusal to apply the presumption against
preemption to the NVRA accords with this basic observation. There
should be no presumption against preemption in this context, just
as there are no other prerequisites—such as a clear statement
rule—which would require Congress to “make its intention [to alter
the usual constitutional balance between the states and the federal
government] ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”276
For example, the Sixth Circuit declined to apply the clear statement
rule to exercises of federal power under the Elections Clause be-
cause
the Clause expressly presses states into the service of the federal
government by specifying that state legislatures “shall” pre-
scribe the details necessary to hold congressional elections. This
stands in stark contrast to virtually all other provisions of the
Constitution, which merely tell the states “not what they must
do but what they can or cannot do.”277
But the Court’s position in Arizona Inter Tribal that every feder-
al action under the Clause displaces some preexisting element of a
state regime applies in a manner that limits federal power in a
274. One could easily make an argument for the application of the presumption in those
cases in which Congress makes legislation, but solely for normative reasons that respect what
has historically been Congress’s posture toward legislation under the Clause. The states are
the first movers with respect to setting the times, places, and manner of federal elections. 
275. See, e.g., In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98, 110, 112 (2d
Cir. 2016) (declining to apply the presumption against preemption because bankruptcy,
governed by Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, is not “an area recognized as
traditionally one of state law alone”).
276. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
277. Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting ACORN v. Edgar, 56
F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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counterintuitive way. First, the few decisions dealing with preemp-
tion under the Elections Clause prior to Arizona Inter Tribal ana-
lyzed the relevant state laws under conflict preemption principles
rather than express preemption, which appropriately reflects that
state and federal law can live harmoniously under the Clause.278
Federal appeals courts have applied two major tests to questions of
Elections Clause preemption in recent years, and these tests conflict
with the Court’s all-or-nothing approach. Despite Arizona Inter
Tribal’s focus on express preemption, none of these tests assess
whether federal law should replace a preexisting state law. The
tests used by the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all provide that
a state election law will be struck down if, and only if, it directly
conflicts with federal law.279 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit perceived Con-
gress’s failure to legislate on a subject as acquiescence in the state
scheme, as opposed to a sign that the exercise of federal power is
278. The Court’s express preemption approach is a curious move, particularly when Justice
Scalia dissented in a case in which the Court tried to treat state and federal power as having
the exact same substantive scope in an analogous context. In King v. Burwell, he drew on the
Elections Clause in arguing that state and federal authority should not be viewed as
equivalents, even if a statute allows Congress to step in when the state has failed to act:
The Court emphasizes that if a State does not set up an Exchange, the Secre-
tary must establish “such Exchange.” It claims that the word “such” implies that
federal and state Exchanges are “the same.” To see the error in this reasoning,
one need only consider a parallel provision from our Constitution: “The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” Just as the Affordable Care
Act directs States to establish Exchanges while allowing the Secretary to
establish “such Exchange” as a fallback, the Elections Clause directs state legis-
latures to prescribe election regulations while allowing Congress to make “such
Regulations” as a fallback. Would anybody refer to an election regulation made
by Congress as a “regulation prescribed by the state legislature”? Would any-
body say that a federal election law and a state election law are in all respects
equivalent? Of course not. The word “such” does not help the Court one whit.
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2499-500 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
279. See Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 775 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A]
state’s discretion and flexibility in establishing the time, place and manner of electing its
federal representatives has only one limitation: the state system cannot directly conflict with
federal election laws on the subject.”); see also Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 394 (9th Cir.
2012), aff’d sub nom. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) (holding that if the two
statutes would complement each other as part of the same scheme, there is no conflict, and
therefore no preemption); Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1252,
1265-66 (D. Kan. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 772 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2014).
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limited by or somehow tied to the actions of the states.280 Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit’s preemption analysis recognized that every action
of Congress is not intended to displace state law, and the court ex-
plicitly took the position that “state and federal laws [are to be
examined] as if they comprise a single system of election proce-
dures.”281
Second, Congress can legislate independently of the states be-
cause, as sovereign, its power over the times, places, and manner of
federal elections is broader than the power retained by the states.282
For example, in Foster v. Love, the Court held that 2 U.S.C § 7,
which sets the November date for the biennial election for federal
offices, preempted a Louisiana law allowing candidates for federal
office to be “elected” on primary day in October if they obtained a
majority of the votes.283 Notably, the Court did not hold that the
states must have the opportunity to set the date for federal elections
first before Congress could act. In addition, congressional power
under the Clause arguably extends to setting voter qualifications if
280. For example, in Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, the court examined the text of
a Texas statute that allowed voting to begin seventeen days before election day, and found
that the statute did not conflict with federal voting statutes requiring that the “election” of
members of Congress and presidential electors occur on the Tuesday after the first Monday
in November. See 199 F.3d at 774. The plaintiffs argued that federal law contemplated that
all voting would occur on the same day because the statutes set a specific date for the
“election” of federal representatives. See id. at 776 (interpreting “election” to mean “the
combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an office holder”
(quoting Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 (1997))). The court held that, “[b]ecause the election
of federal representatives in Texas is not decided or ‘consummated’ before federal election
day,” the Texas laws were not inconsistent with federal law. Id. Notably, the court determined
that Congress’s failure to curb absentee balloting, which is now available in all fifty states but
has been in use for over a century, is persuasive evidence that “election” does not require that
all voters cast ballots on the same day. Id. at 777. In fact, the court noted that there are
certain federal laws in which Congress has actually required that individuals be able to vote
absentee, most notably the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)
and portions of the VRA. Id.
281. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 394.
282. The Court has rejected a construction of congressional power in other contexts in
which the scope of Congress’s authority would be unduly tied to the actions of the states or
the courts. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966) (rejecting New York’s
challenge to the literacy test provisions of the VRA because Congress does not need a judicial
determination that state literacy requirements actually violate the Constitution before
Congress can act).
283. See 522 U.S. 67, 68-69 (1997); see also Millsaps v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 535, 547, 549
(6th Cir. 2001) (upholding the Tennessee early voting statute because the law was “not
intended to make a final selection of a federal officeholder” on the day before Election Day).
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Louisiana had failed to do so for its general election, indicating that
federal power under the Clause is different in kind and scope than
state authority.284 The Court recognized that the Elections Clause
“gives Congress ‘comprehensive’ authority to regulate the details of
elections, including the power to impose ‘the numerous require-
ments as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are
necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.’”285
Functionally, tying federal action to state law calls into question
the myriad examples in which it is not clear whether Congress is
independently making new law or altering some element of the pre-
existing state regime.286 For example, the NVRA allows a state to
remove a person from the official list of registered voters, but only
if the voter: (1) confirms in writing that he has moved outside the
jurisdiction in which he is registered, or (2) fails to return a postage
prepaid, pre-addressed address confirmation card and does not vote
in two consecutive federal election cycles.287 Under Colorado law, an
individual could be removed from the voter rolls if the confirmation
card is returned as undeliverable within twenty days of mailing the
notice, but the State does not check to see if the person has also
failed to vote in two consecutive federal election cycles.288
This provision of the NVRA could be an example of Congress
altering state law by preempting Colorado’s rule that an undeliver-
able confirmation card is sufficient to remove the voter from the
rolls, or Congress could be making new law by adding an additional
requirement that a person must fail to vote in two consecutive
elections before they can be removed from the rolls. It is not imme-
diately apparent which interpretation is the correct one, but if
Congress’s ability to “make” law is tied to replacing some element
of the preexisting state regime, then the constitutionality of this
284. Tolson, supra note 39.
285. Foster, 522 U.S. at 71 n.2 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)); see also
id. (stating that this authority encompasses both congressional elections and “any ‘primary
election which involves a necessary step in the choice of candidates for election as
representatives in Congress’” (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941))).
286. See Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2272 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“A federal
law regulating the operation of grain warehouses, for example, necessarily alters the ‘pre-
existing legal regime erected by the States’—even if only by regulating an activity the States
had chosen not to constrain.” (citation omitted)).
287. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d) (Supp. III 2016).
288. See Common Cause of Colo. v. Buescher, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1264-65 (D. Colo.
2010).
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provision of the NVRA turns on whichever interpretation the court
adopts. The district court in Common Cause of Colorado v. Buescher
construed the Colorado law to apply only to new voters, thereby
avoiding any conflict with the NVRA.289 By reading the NVRA’s dual
requirements to apply to existing voters and leaving Colorado’s
scheme in place as it applies to new voters, the district court’s ap-
proach illustrates Congress’s authority to independently make law,
separate from the state regulatory regime, under the Elections
Clause.
The Supreme Court confronted a similar issue in the winter of
2018 when it heard arguments in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph In-
stitute, which challenges Ohio’s supplemental process that removes
voters who have not engaged in any “voter activity” for two years,
such as filing an address change on a voter registration card or with
a state agency; or voting, either provisionally, through an absentee
ballot, or in person on election day.290 The first method that Ohio
uses to purge its rolls is to remove voters who do not respond to a
confirmation card or update their registration, and who do not vote
in two consecutive federal elections.291 But the supplemental process
imposes an additional burden on voters by allowing them to be
purged after six years of inactivity, even if the person is otherwise
eligible to vote.292 The Sixth Circuit treated the issue as one of
statutory interpretation; however, like the Colorado law, the le-
gitimacy of Ohio’s supplementary scheme depends in part on wheth-
er Congress was making law in enacting the NVRA, which suggests
that states can purge their rolls only in accordance with the NVRA
process;293 or altering state law, which suggests that states can
supplement the NVRA process with their own procedures.294
Treating the validity of Ohio’s supplementary process solely as an
issue of statutory interpretation does not fully resolve why the law
is problematic. For example, a supplemental process is arguably
289. See id. at 1277-78.
290. 838 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir. 2016), argued, No. 16-980 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2018).
291. See id. at 702-03.
292. See id. at 703.
293. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3) (Supp. III 2016); see also Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct.
2247, 2260 (2013) (holding that Arizona’s additional proof of citizenship requirements for
voter registration are preempted by the NVRA).
294. Cf. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2273 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that states
can supplement the federal form).
2276 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2211
contrary to the purpose of the NVRA, which is to “establish pro-
cedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who reg-
ister to vote in elections for Federal office.”295 But the NVRA also
has another purpose that could be consistent with the Ohio scheme:
“to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are
maintained.”296 The NVRA’s statutory scheme suggests that Con-
gress was making new law and prioritizing the former purpose over
the latter.297 Explicitly recognizing Congress’s ability to independ-
ently make law, as the Court failed to do in Arizona Inter Tribal,
avoids muddying the water with respect to whether states can sup-
plement federal voting requirements, even if doing so would make
it harder for individuals to vote. In theory, this increased difficulty
should raise concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment, but
despite recent successes, such claims are usually difficult to pros-
ecute.298 Thus, clarity under the Elections Clause doctrine is espe-
cially important.
HAVA’s provisional balloting requirements raise a separate
question about whether the federal government can impose new,
substantive requirements on the states that are not traceable to
state law, or that might skirt the boundaries of what is considered
a time, place, and manner regulation. Section 303(b) of HAVA
requires a voter who registered by mail to present photo identifica-
tion or documentary proof of identification when voting in person
for the first time.299 Without such identification, states must treat
a prospective voter’s ballot as provisional until he or she produces
the proper documentation.300 Prior to HAVA, many states required
voters to produce identification at other points during the voting
process; allowed individuals to vote using less onerous forms of
295. 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1).
296. Id. § 20501(b)(4); see A. Philip Randolph Inst., 838 F.3d at 705-06 (recognizing the
tension between the dual purposes of the NVRA but noting that the statute imposes “multiple
constraints” on the state’s ability to maintain accurate voter rolls).
297. See Franita Tolson, Husted, Arizona Inter Tribal, and Lessons from the Constitutional
Structure, ACS BLOG (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/husted-arizona-inter-
tribal-and-lessons-from-the-constitutional-structure-0 [https://perma.cc/52V9-TAR4] (noting
that the NVRA “imposes significant constraints on the states’ ability to remove voters”).
298. And will likely become more difficult given the spate of recent judicial appointees to
the federal courts—appointees who are less likely to be amenable to voting rights claims than
appointees of the prior Administration.
299. Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. § 21083(b)(1)-(2).
300. Id. § 21083(b)(2)(B).
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identification; or utilized procedures, including for provisional bal-
lots, that were altogether different. To the extent that voter identi-
fication requirements straddle the line between manner regulation
and voter qualification standards, HAVA might raise some consti-
tutional concerns.301
Courts have already mediated disputes over the scope of HAVA
and the extent to which it displaces state law. In Sandusky County
Democratic Party v. Blackwell, the district court concluded that
voters have a right to cast a provisional ballot under HAVA and a
private right of action to enforce the provisional voting requirement,
but the state was not required to count provisional ballots cast in
the wrong precinct.302 The court reasoned that “[t]here is no reason
to think that HAVA, which explicitly defers determination of
whether ballots are to be counted to the States, should be inter-
preted as imposing upon the States a federal requirement that out-
of-precinct ballots be counted.”303
In contrast, White v. Blackwell read HAVA to require states to
allow voters who requested (but did not cast) an absentee ballot to
vote provisionally.304 At the time of the election, Ohio did not have
a law that was preempted by this requirement.305 White v. Blackwell
is a prime example of Congress creating “new law” pursuant to its
authority under the Elections Clause while Sandusky takes a more
conservative view of Congress’s intent to “make” new law given the
statute’s structure. But both cases implicitly recognize that Con-
gress has independent authority to legislate and use HAVA—rather
than state law—as the baseline for resolving the thorny issues in
these cases.306
301. Tolson, supra note 83.
302. 387 F.3d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
303. Id. at 578.
304. See White v. Blackwell, 418 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
305. See id. at 990-91 (discussing how Ohio Rev. Code § 3509(B)(1) moots the litigation
because it requires the state to allow electors to cast a provisional ballot when the elector has
requested (but not received) an absentee ballot).
306. See, e.g., Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2270-75 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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2. The Incidents of Congressional Sovereignty: Commandeering
State Offices, State Law, and State Officials
In addition to its authority to “make or alter” state regulations,
the sharpest and most prominent iteration of congressional sover-
eignty under the Elections Clause is its power to commandeer state
offices, state law, and state officials—authority that stands in stark
contrast to traditional views about the nature of sovereignty under
federalism doctrine.307 Under a cooperative federalism framework,
Congress might be able to depart from the anticommandeering prin-
ciple, but the Elections Clause allows Congress to go much further
than even the most permissive theory of federalism. And despite the
reinvigoration of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence and the ad-
vent of new, judicially created safeguards to preserve state power,
Congress’s authority to commandeer state officials pursuant to the
Elections Clause remains unchanged. As Samuel Issacharoff has
observed,
[Congress’s] power to enforce its “general supervisory power”...
has remained intact [under the Elections Clause], even with the
Court’s developing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, which
carves out a protected zone for core state functions.... Similarly,
direct federal regulation [of elections] is unaffected by the
concern for impermissible federal commandeering of state
functions presented by congressional attempts to compel state
undertakings for federal programs directly.308
The text of the Clause similarly suggests that Congress, in the
course of exercising its authority, can commandeer the offices, law,
and officials of the state in accordance with its “general supervisory
power.”309 The Clause’s provision that “[t]he Times, Places and Man-
ner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
307. See Morley, supra note 185, at 101 (noting that the Supreme Court has not resolved
this issue, but determining that “anti-commandeering challenges ... are unlikely to succeed”);
Weinstein-Tull, supra note 34, at 752. Other scholars have also argued that Congress can
commandeer state officials when acting pursuant to the Elections Clause. See, e.g., Evan H.
Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199,
237-38.
308. Issacharoff, supra note 47, at 109.
309. See id. (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387 (1879)).
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prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof ” is very different
from Congress’s authority, which “may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations.”310 The use of the mandatory language “shall
be prescribed” to describe state authority and “may ... make or alter”
to describe congressional authority, illustrates that Congress can act
if it chooses, but states must act, even if at the behest of Congress.
Arguably, neither the language of the Elections Clause nor its
structure justifies reading “shall” as anything other than a direct
command to the states to enact the laws governing federal elections,
or to permit Congress to commandeer the state regulatory regime
if the states have failed to carry out their duty. The Elections Clause
uses both “shall” and “may” in its language, so to interpret “shall”
to mean “may” in order to limit Congress’s ability to commandeer
the states would result in the perverse outcome that neither govern-
ment is obligated to issue the laws that govern federal elections. The
lack of a clear directive to either sovereign also stands at odds with
the purpose of the Clause, in which ensuring that states make pro-
visions for federal elections is integral to preserving their overall
legitimacy.
This view is consistent with how the Supreme Court has gener-
ally interpreted “shall,” a term signaling that Congress can con-
ceivably—and in other contexts, impermissibly—draft state officials
into implementing a federal regulatory regime.311 Indeed, those
times where the Court has interpreted “shall” to mean “may” have
been to avoid the constitutional issues created by Congress’s com-
mandeering of state officials in the context of the Commerce Clause
which, unlike the Elections Clause, does not give Congress the same
commandeering power.
In New York v. United States, for example, the Court invalidated
a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985, which required that states form regional compacts with
other states in order to dispose of waste generated within their bor-
ders; those states that refused to comply were forced to take title to
waste generated by any source and pay damages incurred by the
310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
311. See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1995) (“Though
‘shall’ generally means ‘must,’ legal writers sometimes use, or misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’
‘will,’ or even ‘may.’ For example, certain of the Federal Rules use the word ‘shall’ to
authorize, but not to require, judicial action.” (citations omitted)).
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failure to take prompt possession.312 The Court held that Congress
could not commandeer states into enacting a federal regulatory
program by forcing them to take title to their waste.313 However, the
Court applied the constitutional avoidance canon to section 2032c(a)
(1)(A) of the Act, declining to read its language that “[e]ach State
shall be responsible for providing ... for the disposal of ... low-level
radioactive waste generated within the State” as a direct command
from Congress, “despite the statute’s use of the word ‘shall,’” be-
cause “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe
the statute to avoid such problems.”314 Thus, the Court read “shall”
to mean “may” and treated section 2021c(a)(1)(A) as establishing a
series of incentives in order to encourage states to dispose of their
waste.
Recent cases have confirmed that the Court interprets “shall” to
mean “may” in order to avoid striking down the statute only because
the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to commandeer state
officials as a strict interpretation of “shall” would require. In Na-
tional Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, the dissent-
ers argued that the individual mandate was a penalty for this very
reason because it “commands that every ‘applicable individual shall
... ensure that the individual ... is covered under minimum essential
coverage.’”315 Instead, the Court treated the mandate, which en-
couraged people to get health insurance by imposing a tax for non-
compliance, as a financial incentive similar to those at issue in New
York v. United States.316
Avoiding potentially unconstitutional interpretations is not the
only reason the Court has interpreted “shall” to be permissive. The
Court also has done so in order to bring coherence to an otherwise
ambiguous statutory scheme. In Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,
312. 505 U.S. 144, 151-54 (1992).
313. Id. at 149.
314. Id. at 151, 170 (second omission in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021c(a)(1)(A) (1988)); see also Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 663 (2012)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to read New York v. United States to “justify reading ‘shall’
to mean ‘may’” because the “‘shall’ in that case was contained in an introductory provision—a
recital that provided for no legal consequences”).
315. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 649 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. IV
2006)).
316. See id. at 568-70 (majority opinion).
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for example, the Court declined to read “shall” as mandatory in
interpreting the Westfall Act,317 which empowers the Attorney
General to certify that a federal employee was acting within the
scope of his employment if that employee is sued for a wrongful or
negligent act.318 The Act provides that, “Upon certification by the
Attorney General ..., any civil action or proceeding ... shall be deem-
ed an action against the United States ..., and the United States
shall be substituted as the party defendant.”319 Reading “shall” to be
mandatory instead of permissive would make the Attorney Gener-
al’s certification conclusive, and in the process, run afoul of the
“traditional understandings and basic principles[ ] that executive
determinations generally are subject to judicial review and that
mechanical judgments are not the kind federal courts are set up to
render.”320 In contrast, the Elections Clause’s Congress-centric focus,
which allows states to be pushed into the service of the federal gov-
ernment, is not inherently ambiguous such that reading the term
“shall” as mandatory instead of permissive creates separation of
powers (or any other structural) issues.
The Court in Arizona Inter Tribal, by reasoning that the Elections
Clause is an area of concurrent state and federal power in which
each government exercises power of the same kind and type, hobbles
Congress’s commandeering authority. Congress’s ability to comman-
deer the states is unlike any power that the states possess and often
occurs in the absence of state action.321 Over the past two centuries,
Congress has stepped in to facilitate election administration when
the states have been unable or unwilling to do so, commandeering
state officials, state facilities, and state law to ensure the continued
health of federal elections. During the Reconstruction Era, for
example, Congress sought to force state election officials to comply
with state law by making noncompliance with state law a federal
crime.322 The Enforcement Act of 1870 incorporated by reference
317. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 436-37 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.).
318. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2012).
319. Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 421-22 (majority opinion) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(d)(1) (1994)).
320. Id. at 434.
321. Arizona Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013).
322. See Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 22, 16 Stat. 140, 145. For example, section 22
of the Enforcement Act of 1870 provided:
That any officer of any election at which any representative or delegate in the
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substantive state law that governed the mechanics of federal elec-
tions,323 exposing state officials to dual liability that blurred the
lines of accountability at the core of the Court’s anticommandeering
jurisprudence.324 In the companion cases of Ex parte Siebold and Ex
parte Clarke, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that this
use of state law and state officials was impermissible, noting in
Siebold that
it cannot be disputed that if Congress has power to make
regulations it must have the power to enforce them, not only by
punishing the delinquency of officers appointed by the United
States, but by restraining and punishing those who attempt to
interfere with them in the performance of their duties.325
The Court further argued that, while “Congress has no power to
enforce State laws or to punish State officers, and especially has no
power to punish them for violating the laws of their own State,”
Congress can punish them for violating federal law.326
More recently, Congress has commandeered both state officials
and state offices by imposing affirmative obligations on the states
to implement the NVRA. Under section 10 of the NVRA, each state
must designate a state officer as the chief state election official re-
sponsible for coordinating the requirements of the Act.327 The NVRA
also requires each state to designate all offices in the state that
Congress of the United States shall be voted for, whether such officer of election
be appointed or created by or under any law or authority of the United States
or by or under any State, territorial, district, or municipal law or authority, who
shall neglect or refuse to perform any duty in regard to such election required
of him by any law of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof; or
violate any duty so imposed, or knowingly do any act thereby unauthorized, with
intent to affect any such election ... shall be deemed guilty of a crime and shall
be liable to prosecution and punishment therefor.
Id.
323. Id. § 2.
324. See Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, 408 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting).
325. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387 (1879).
326. Id.; see also id. at 388. (“It is the duty of the States to elect representatives to
Congress. The due and fair election of these representatives is of vital importance to the
United States. The government of the United States is no less concerned in the transaction
than the State government is. It certainly is not bound to stand by as a passive spectator,
when duties are violated and outrageous frauds are committed.”).
327. 52 U.S.C. § 20509 (Supp. III 2016).
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provide either public assistance or state-funded programs primarily
engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities as voter
registration agencies.328 In Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, Cali-
fornia argued that these provisions violated the Tenth Amendment
by commandeering state agencies to administer a federal election
scheme.329 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that
“Congress may conscript state agencies to carry out voter registra-
tion for the election of Representatives and Senators. The exercise
of that power by Congress is by its terms intended to be borne by
the states without compensation.”330 Courts in both Pennsylvania
and South Carolina declined to impose an anticommandeering rule
for similar reasons, recognizing that Congress can directly regulate
the state’s manner and means of voter registration.331
CONCLUSION
Despite the increasing sophistication in how we think about
federalism both descriptively and normatively, this Article shows
how federalism doctrine is a poor framework for understanding the
nature of the Elections Clause and the values the Clause embodies.
To the extent that federalism traditionally is, and has been, about
granting a subunit of government final policy-making authority in
an area of governance, the Clause denies states the true hallmark
of sovereignty by giving Congress veto authority over the times,
places, and manner of federal elections. Other theories of federal-
ism, most of which are less focused on sovereignty and instead
promote the instrumental uses of federalism, fail to capture the
unique dynamics that motivate federal action in this area, action
328. Id. § 20506(2)(A)-(B); see Nat’l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def.
Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 285 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that NVRA applies to public
colleges); Nat’l Coal. for Students with Disabilities v. Taft, No. 2:00-CV-1300, 2002 WL
31409443, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2002) (same); see also United States v. New York, 700 F.
Supp. 2d 186, 203-04 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that NVRA applies to public colleges and
community colleges).
329. 60 F.3d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1995).
330. Id.
331. See Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Ridge, Nos. CIV. A. 94-7671 &
CIV. A. 95-382, 1995 WL 136913, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1995); Condon v. Reno, 913 F.
Supp. 946, 963 (D.S.C. 1995).
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that is primarily focused on preserving the legitimacy of federal
elections.
The failure to recognize congressional sovereignty in this context
has led courts to interpret Congress’s power under the Elections
Clause more narrowly than is appropriate in order to avoid in-
truding on the states’ authority over elections. Because Congress is
sovereign with respect to federal elections, however, the Court’s
long-standing deference to the states is not only unnecessary, but
courts, scholars, and advocates should consider the sheer breadth of
the Clause and its irreverence of state power when thinking about
the protections that the Constitution extends to the right to vote.
These considerations are important on the eve of the 2020 redis-
tricting cycle, as courts struggle to define the scope of the anti-
discrimination framework under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, leaving room for the Elections Clause to play an
important supporting role in voting rights enforcement.
